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THE IMPOSITION OF FEDERAL CAPS IN MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY ACTIONS: WILL THEY CURE 
THE CURRENT CRISIS IN HEALTH CARE? 
Adam D. Glassman ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today in the United States we have a medical emergency on our 
hands.  Many physicians1 have experienced exorbitant medical 
malpractice liability insurance premium increases, oftentimes as high as 
100% or even 200% over the previous year.2  Others have been 
summarily discarded by their insurance carriers.3  As a result, doctors 
have been left with few alternatives, including: selecting other insurers, 
practicing without coverage, moving to and practicing in states with 
lower medical malpractice insurance premiums than their own, or simply 
giving up medicine altogether.4 
While this growing epidemic must be dealt with immediately, there 
has been no consensus on how to tackle the problem faced by the 
medical community and, in turn, by Americans in need of reliable health 
care. 
Earlier this year, the American Medical Association (AMA) 
declared that eighteen states are currently facing a medical insurance 
crisis.5  Notwithstanding this finding, “[s]oaring premiums on medical 
 
 ∗  Assistant Professor of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College/CUNY. J.D. 
1994, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1991, Brooklyn College/CUNY. I would like to 
thank Melissa Glassman, Hope Glassman, Leo Glassman, and Harrison Glassman for their undying 
support and inspiration.  I would like to thank Alan C. Glassman, Esq., who inspired me to become 
a lawyer, and who made my career as a lawyer possible. 
 1. Particularly those engaging in high-risk specialties, such as obstetrics and anesthesiology. 
 2. Weiss Ratings, Inc., The Impact of Non-Economic Damage Caps on Physician Premiums, 
Claims Payout Levels, and Availability of Coverage, http://www.weissratings.com/malpractice.asp 
(June, 2003). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Yank D. Coble, Jr., MD., AMA President, AMA Survey Shows Patients Losing Access to 
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malpractice insurance are a national crisis, invading the practice of 
medicine, threatening the availability of care, and prompting widespread 
public outcry.”6 
The AMA has warned, “[y]ou know that our health care system is 
facing a crisis when patients have to leave their state to receive urgent 
surgical care, or when pregnant women cannot find an obstetrician to 
monitor their pregnancies and deliver their babies.”7  Furthermore, the 
AMA has cautioned Americans that: 
Escalating jury awards and the high cost of defending against lawsuits, 
even meritless claims, are causing medical liability insurance 
premiums to soar . . . [and that] . . . [o]ver the past two years, many 
physicians have been hit with medical liability premium increases of 
25 to 400 percent. As medical liability insurance becomes unaffordable 
or unavailable, physicians are being forced to close their practices or 
drop vital services—seriously affecting patient access to care. There 
are now 19 states in crisis, up from 12 states last year. In many other 
states a crisis is looming.  The GAO recently studied five crisis states 
and found examples of reduced access to care affecting emergency 
surgery and newborn deliveries. We have no doubt that the GAO 
would have found similar access problems had it examined the other 
14 crisis states.  This is why AMA worked so hard to seek passage of 
H.R. 5 in the House, and why we continue to seek passage of similar 
legislation in the Senate.  One of the key provisions in H.R. 5 is a 
$250,000.00 limit on non-economic damages, with flexibility for states 
to adjust the cap to suit their circumstances.  This limit on non-
economic damages has worked in California, and it can work 
nationwide.  As the GAO recently reported, medical liability insurance 
premium growth has been slower in states with non-economic damage 
caps that in states with limited reforms.  Also, a recent study by the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) shows that 
reasonable limits on non-economic damages can improve the per 
capita supply of physicians. We cannot afford the luxury of waiting 
until the liability crisis gets worse to take action.  Too many patients 
will be hurt.  We must bring common sense back to our courtrooms so 
 
Care, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/1616-7494.html (April 3, 2003).  According to the 
AMA, these crisis states include: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington and West Virginia. (There are 18 not 19 states listed here) Id. 
 6. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2. 
 7. John C. Nelson, M.D., AMA President-Elect, AMA To Congress: Our Nation’s Liability 
System Threatens Patients’ Access to Health Care, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/1616-
8067.html, (October 1, 2003). Excepted from Dr. Nelson’s testimony before the House Government 
Reform Subcommittee on Wellness and Human Rights (October 1, 2003). 
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patients have access to physicians – in emergency rooms, delivery 
rooms and operating rooms.8 
Moreover, a March 2003 study9 conducted by the AMA concluded: 
(1) 64.8 percent of America’s high-risk specialists have made changes 
to their practice, including no longer providing certain services, 
referring complex cases, closing their practice, and more; (2) 24.2 
percent of high-risk specialists stopped providing certain services, 
including emergency and trauma care and delivering babies; 92.4 
percent of high-risk specialists said that liability pressures were 
important in their decision to stop providing certain services; (3) 41.5 
percent of high-risk specialists began referring complex cases; 34 
percent of physicians surveyed in AMA crisis states began referring 
complex cases compared to 24 percent in non-crisis states.10 
In the past six months, the ongoing debate concerning the root 
causes of the recent escalation in medical malpractice liability insurance 
rates has reached a fevered pitch.  Physicians and the insurance industry 
place the blame on lawyers, excessive litigation and out-of-control jury 
awards.11  The solution they propose, to wit, the imposition of caps on 
non-economic damages in medical malpractice liability cases, has found 
its way into numerous state legislatures, as well as the United States 
Congress.12  As of June 2003, nineteen states have implemented caps on 
non-economic damage.13 
The battle cry for caps has, in large part, been adopted by 
Republican legislators on both the state and federal level.  Ultimately, 
however, it is the objective of the GOP to federalize caps on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice liability cases, thus 
preempting those states opposed to caps from resisting them any 
longer.14 
Opponents of the GOP’s efforts to federalize caps include 
numerous Democratic state and federal legislators, the American Trial 
Lawyer’s Association (ATLA), state trial lawyer associations, and 
consumer watchdog groups.  These critics of federal caps acknowledge 
that while there is a growing epidemic in our health care system, jury 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Coble, supra note 5. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See infra notes 20-30 and accompanying text. 
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verdicts are not the prime culprit.15  They further maintain that caps have 
not proven successful in either diminishing insurance premiums, or, in 
fact, stabilizing them in states where they have been implemented.16  
Finally, opponents of caps maintain that the insurance industry is 
diverting the public’s attention away from other, more significant causes 
of escalating premiums, including, inter alia, the rising cost of medical 
products, financial setbacks faced by insurers over the past four years, 
and industry-wide mismanagement.17 
This article seeks to uncover the truth behind America’s current 
health care emergency.  In so doing, the causes behind escalating 
medical malpractice premiums over the past decade will be examined; 
attention will be focused on the issue of whether caps on non-economic 
damages have been successful in reducing insurance premiums in states 
where they have been implemented.18  Finally, an alternative approach 
than that taken by President Bush, Congressional Republicans, the 
American Medical Association, and the insurance industry, will be 
propounded.19 
II. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH’S VISION 
On January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush delivered his State 
of the Union Address.20  During this address, he launched the opening 
salvo in his war to rehabilitate America’s ailing health care system, a 
system he believes has fallen prey to “bureaucrats and trial lawyers” and 
“excessive litigation.”21 The President declared: 
Our . . . goal is high quality, affordable health care for all Americans. 
The American system of medicine is a model of skill and innovation, 
with a pace of discovery that is adding good years to our lives. Yet for 
many people, medical care costs too much—and many have no 
coverage at all. These problems will not be solved with a nationalized 
health care system that dictates coverage and rations care. 
Instead, we must work toward a system in which all Americans have a 
good insurance policy, choose their own doctors, and seniors and low-
income Americans receive the help they need. Instead of bureaucrats 
 
 15. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See infra notes 289-316 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 317-318 and accompanying text. 
 20. President of The United States, George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (January 28, 2003). 
 21. Id. 
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and trial lawyers and HMO’s, we must put doctors and nurses and 
patients back in charge of American medicine. 
. . . . 
To improve our health care system, we must address one of the prime 
causes of higher cost, the constant threat that physicians and hospitals 
will be unfairly sued. Because of excessive litigation, everybody pays 
more for health care, and many parts of America are losing fine 
doctors. No one has ever been healed by a frivolous lawsuit. I urge the 
Congress to pass medical liability reform.22 
III. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION AIMED AT, INTER ALIA, 
FEDERALIZING CAPS ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY CASES 
A.  House Resolution 5 (H.R. 5) 
Within one week of the President’s State of the Union Address, 
H.R. 5, officially titled,23 “To Improve Patient Access to Health Care 
Services and Provide Improved Medical Care by Reducing the 
Excessive Burden the Liability System Places on the Health Care 
Delivery System,” was introduced in the United States House of 
Representatives.24 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.congress.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00005:@@@L& summ2=m&.  The bill’s short title was “Help Efficient, 
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003.”  Id. 
 24. Id.  The bill was formally introduced on February 5, 2003. Id. Following its introduction, 
the bill proceeded along the following course: 
2/5/2003:  Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 
in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
committee concerned.  Referred to House Judiciary 
3/4/2003:  Committee Hearings Held. 
3/5/2003:  Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held.  Ordered to be Reported 
(Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 15 - 13. 
 
2/5/2003:  Referred to House Energy and Commerce 
2/14/2003:  Referred to the Subcommittee on Health, for a period to be subsequently 
determined by the Chairman. 
3/4/2003:  Referred to the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection.  
Subcommittee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held.  Forwarded by 
Subcommittee to Full Committee (Amended) by Voice Vote. 
3/6/2003:  Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held.  Ordered to be Reported 
(Amended) by Voice Vote. 
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While the bill was quite similar to H.R. 4600,25 which passed the 
House in 2002 but never reached a vote in the Senate, H.R. 5 would 
apply to any “health care lawsuit,” including civil actions against 
manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, marketers, promoters, or sellers of 
 
3/11/2003 6:51pm:  Reported (Amended) by the Committee on Judiciary. H. Rept. 108-
32, Part I. 
3/11/2003 6:52pm:  Reported (Amended) by the Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
H. Rept. 108-32, Part II.  Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 20. 
3/12/2003 9:52pm:  Rules Committee Resolution H. Res. 139 Reported to House. Rule 
provides for consideration of H.R. 5 with 2 hours of general debate. Previous question 
shall be considered as ordered without intervening motions except motion to 
recommit with or without instructions. Provides for 80 minutes equally divided and 
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary and 40 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking 
minority member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. The rule waives all 
points of order against consideration of the bill. Measure will be considered read. The 
rule provides that in lieu of the amendments recommended by the Committees on the 
Judiciary and on Energy and Commerce now printed in the bill, the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute printed in the Rules Committee report (H. Rept. 108-34) shall be 
considered as adopted. The rule provides that H.Res. 126 is laid on . . . . 
3/13/2003 12:05pm:  Rule H. Res. 139 passed House. 
3/13/2003 12:06pm:  Considered under the provisions of rule H. Res. 139. 
(consideration: CR H1817-1871, H1879-1880; text of measure as reported in House: 
CR H1829-1832).  H.AMDT.6 Amendment in the nature of a substitute reported by 
the House Committee on Rules (consideration: CR H1832-1834; text: CR H1832-
1834).  An amendment in the nature of a substitute considered as adopted pursuant to 
the provisions of H. Res. 139. 
3/13/2003 12:07pm:  H.AMDT.6 On agreeing to the Rules amendment (A001) Agreed 
to without objection. 
3/13/2003 2:35pm:  The previous question was ordered pursuant to the rule.  Mr. 
Conyers moved to recommit with instructions to Judiciary and Energy and 
Commerce. 
3/13/2003 2:46pm:  The previous question on the motion to recommit with instructions 
was ordered without objection. 
3/13/2003 3:06pm:  On motion to recommit with instructions Failed by the Yeas and 
Nays: 191 - 234 (Roll no. 63) (consideration: CR H1866-1871; text: CR H1866-
1869). 
3/13/2003 3:13pm:  On passage Passed by recorded vote: 229 - 196, 1 Present (Roll No. 
64) (text: CR H1832-1834). 
3/13/2003 3:13pm:  Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection. 
3/13/2003:  Received in the Senate. 
3/20/2003:  Read the first time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under Read the 
First Time. 
3/21/2003:  Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General 
Orders. Calendar No. 49. 
Id. 
 25. H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/D?d107:1:./temp/~bd69UB: @@@X|/bss/d107query.html.  The House of 
Representatives passed H.R. 4600, entitled the “Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely 
Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2002,” by a vote of 217 to 203, on September 26, 2002.  See 
Update: House Passes H.R. 4600, 165 PRODUCTS LIABILITY ADVISORY 8 (November 2002). 
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drugs or medical devices, regardless of the theory of liability.26 
In sum, H.R. 5 limits recovery of non-economic27 damages in 
health care lawsuits to $250,000.28  Awards for future non-economic 
damages would not be discounted to present value.29  The statute does 
away with joint liability, thus, each tortfeasor’s liability would be limited 
to his/her/its several share of any damages only, and not include the 
share of any other person.30 
As to punitive damages: 
[T]he proposed law would (1) require proof by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant acted with malicious intent to injure the 
claimant or deliberately failed to avoid unnecessary injury that the 
defendant knew the claimant was substantially certain to suffer; (2) 
permit punitive damages to be sought only after a court finding of 
substantial probability that the plaintiff would prevail; (3) bar punitive 
damages where no compensatory damages are awarded; (4) limit the 
amount of punitive damages to two times the amount of economic 
damages awarded or $250,000.00, whichever is greater; and (5) bar 
punitive awards, absent fraud or bribery, against manufacturers or 
distributors of medical products unless it is demonstrated that the harm 
resulted from a defendant’s failure to comply with a specific Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) requirement.31 
Moreover, H.R. 5 limits an attorney’s entitlement32 to contingent 
fees in a medical malpractice liability lawsuit.33  Specifically, the 
maximum fee an attorney could charge a client in a medical malpractice 
liability action would be limited to (1) 40 percent of the first $50,000 
recovered; (2) 33 1/3 percent of the next $50,000; (3) 25 percent of the 
next $500,000; and (4) 15 percent of any recovery in excess of 
 
 26. House Passes Bill That Would Limit Products Liability Claims Involving Medical 
Products, 170 Products Liability Advisory 5 (April 2003). 
 27. Non-economic damages are generally those damages awarded for a litigant’s past and/or 
future pain and suffering. House Resolution 5 defines non-economic damages as: “damages for 
physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, 
disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium 
(other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all other 
nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature.” H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003), available at 
http://www.congress. gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00005:@@@L&summ2=m&. 
 28. House Passes Bill, supra note 26. 
 29. Id. In essence, the bill calls for the annuitized payout of future, non-economic damages 
awards in excess of $50,000.  See id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. And, presumably, an attorney’s incentive to take such cases. 
 33. House Passes Bill, supra note 26. 
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$600,000.34 
Other provisions of the bill would: (1) establish a limitations 
period35 of the earlier of (a) 3 years after the date of injury, or (b) 1 year 
after the injury was or should have been discovered; and (2) allow 
evidence of collateral source benefits.36 
Finally, H.R. 5 seeks to preempt any contrary state law, except any 
law that imposes greater protections, such as a shorter statute of 
limitations for health care providers and health care organizations from 
liability, loss, or damages than those provided by the Act.37  Also 
exempted from preemption would be any state statutory limit on the 
amount of damages that may be awarded in a health care lawsuit, 
whether or not the state limit is more or less than the limit under this 
Act; and any defense available to a party in a health care lawsuit.38 
According to a number of dissenters in the House of 
Representatives:39 
[H.R. 5] offers a “solution” prior to having discovered the root of the 
problem. Instead of reducing the occurrence of frivolous lawsuits, 
providing direct assistance to health care providers and communities, 
and examining every aspect of the problem, this legislation restricts the 
legal rights of those who have been truly wronged. 
. . . . 
While the rising cost of malpractice insurance is a real concern for 
doctors and patients alike, we have serious reservations about this 
proposed “solution” for three primary reasons.  First, what has caused 
the increase in malpractice insurance premiums is not easily identified.  
Moreover, it is not clear that this legislation will reduce the medical 
malpractice premiums that providers must pay to insurance companies.  
Second, the scope and severity of the provisions in H.R. 5 impose 
unreasonable restrictions on an injured patient’s ability to hold 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. The time within which a litigant must bring a lawsuit or forever be barred from doing so.  
This is synonymous with the term “statute of limitations.”  Limitation is defined as “a statutory 
period after which a lawsuit or prosecution cannot be brought in court.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
939 (7th ed. 1999). 
 36. House Passes Bill, supra note 26. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Democratic Staff of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Dissenting Views on H.R. 
5: Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2003, http://www. 
house.gov/commerce_democrats/ legviews/108lvhr0005.htm (March 2003).  Representatives John 
D. Dingell, Lois Capps, Jan Schakowsky, Frank Pallone, Jr., Ted Strickland, Hilda L. Solis, Sherrod 
Brown, Edward J. Markey, Henry A. Waxman, Edolphus Towns, Rick Boucher, Bart Stupak, and 
Mike Doyle.  Id. 
8
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wrongdoers accountable. Third, the legislation is over-broad, 
protecting the interests of large corporations, such as Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMO’s) and drug companies, at the 
expense of health care providers and patients. The legislation provides 
nothing more than a shield for bad actors rather than meaningful 
reforms for overburdened doctors and providers. 
To find an effective solution, we must closely examine the insurance 
industry and how its conduct affects medical malpractice premiums, an 
activity not undertaken by this Committee.  We know that many 
factors completely unrelated to jury verdicts and the civil justice 
system affect insurance rates: changes in state law and regulatory 
requirements; competitiveness of the insurance market; the types of 
policies issued within the industry; interest rates; and national 
economic trends. Moreover, there is scant evidence to date that various 
state tort reforms have realized appreciable premium savings.  In a 
comparison of states that enacted severe tort restrictions during the 
mid-1980’s and those that resisted enacting tort reform, a recent study 
found no correlation between tort reform and insurance rates. 
Insurance markets are subject to cycles, periods of underpricing of 
premiums to increase market share and book premium dollars, 
followed by a hardening of the market.  Once the market hardens, 
competition intensifies, underwriting results deteriorate, and 
investment incomes fall. Insurance companies then need to raise 
premiums to cover losses.  We are now in the midst of a ‘‘hard’’ phase 
of the insurance cycle and increases in malpractice premiums are 
consistent with overall market trends.  This problem is not unique to 
malpractice insurance. While medical malpractice insurance premiums 
for the three riskiest specialties increased 10% from 2000 to 2001, auto 
insurance premiums saw similar increases of 8.4% during that same 
period. 
A serious effort to provide relief to providers from high malpractice 
premiums would have looked at these and other issues.  A number of 
Congressional Democrats have requested the General Accounting 
Office look into these questions.  The Committee, however, chose to 
take a one-sided approach. Reps. Brown, Pallone, and Capps offered 
amendments that would encourage insurance reforms both on the state 
and federal levels.  Each of those amendments was defeated on a 
partisan basis. Rep. Dingell offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute during the full Committee Markup of H.R. 5.  The 
Democratic substitute would have provided direct assistance to health 
care providers and communities, reduced frivolous lawsuits, and 
established an independent advisory commission to thoroughly 
examine the problem and propose long-term solutions. It was also 
9
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defeated on a partisan basis.40 
Despite the above dissent, on March 13, 2003, H.R. 5 was approved 
by the House of Representatives by a vote of 229 to 196.41  In response 
to the passage of H.R. 5, the American Medical Association issued the 
following press release: 
The American Medical Association (AMA) applauds the House of 
Representatives for passing true medical liability reform legislation, 
which includes a $250,000.00 cap on non-economic damages.  The 
AMA thanks Representative Greenwood (R-PA), Chairman Tauzin (R-
LA), Chairman Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and Representative Cox (R-CA) 
for their leadership on this issue of great importance to America’s 
patients and physicians. 
By voting “yes” to medical liability reform legislation, Congress 
recognizes that our current medical liability system is broken and 
threatening access to care for millions of Americans, particularly in 
regard to high-risk medical care and services. 
Doctors forced to move out of state, take early retirement, or stop 
practicing high-risk procedures because of sky-rocketing insurance 
premiums have left much of the nation in an access-to-care crisis or 
near-crisis situation. 
The legislation passed by Congress today is based on a proven reform 
system in place in California since 1975.  As a result, medical 
insurance premiums in California have increased only 167 percent, 
while premiums in the rest of the country have risen 505 percent.  
Capping non-economic damages at $250,000.00 will help curb the 
jackpot lottery mentality that is jeopardizing patient care in this 
country. 
The AMA, President Bush and now the House of Representatives 
agree – common-sense medical liability reforms are needed to protect 
patients’ access to care.  The AMA looks forward to working with the 
Senate to ensure passage of similar legislation that preserves access to 
care for all Americans.42 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. See supra, note 24. 
 42. Yank D. Coble, Jr., M.D., AMA President, AMA Applauds Passage of H.R.5, http://www. 
ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/1617-7392.html (March 13, 2003). 
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B.  Senate Bill 607 (S. 607) 
On March 12, 2003, S. 607, formally titled43 “A Bill to Improve 
Patient Access to Health Care Services and Provide Improved Medical 
Care by Reducing the Excessive Burden the Liability System Places on 
the Health Care Delivery System,” was introduced in the United States 
Senate by Nevada Senator John E. Ensign.44  While the bill was similar 
to H.R. 5, it differed from H.R. 5 to the extent that it did not address 
punitive damages, collateral source offsets, and the annuitized payments 
of future non-economic damages in excess of $50,000. 
C.  Senate Bill 11 (S. 11) 
Following passage of H.R. 5, in an effort to conform the Senate’s 
bill to that of the House, Senator Ensign substituted S. 607 with S. 11.45 
While similar in content to S. 607, S. 11 more closely followed H.R. 5 
with its inclusion of provisions relating to punitive damages, collateral 
source offsets and the annuitized payments of future non-economic 
damages in excess of $50,000. 
Recently, the advancement of Senator Ensign’s bill ground to halt 
when its opponents successfully filibustered46 S. 11.47  On July 9, 2003, 
 
 43. S. 60, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109: 
SN00607:@@@L& summ2=m&.  The bill’s short title was, “Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, 
Timely Healthcare Act of 2003.”  Id.  Following its introduction, the bill proceeded along the 
following course: 
3/12/2003:  Introduced in the Senate. Read the first time. Placed on Senate Legislative 
Calendar under Read the First Time. 
3/13/2003:  Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General 
Orders. Calendar No. 33. 
Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  While S.11 bore the same official title as S.607, its short name was changed to 
“HEALTH Act of 2003,” apparently to correspond with H.R.5.  Id. 
 46. U.S. Senate, Filibuster and Cloture, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/com-
mon/briefing/Filibuster _Cloture.htm.  A filibuster is an attempt to block or delay Senate action on a 
bill or other matter: 
Using the filibuster to delay, debate or block legislation has a long history. In the United 
States, the term filibuster—from a Dutch word meaning “pirate”—became popular in the 
1850’s when it was applied to efforts to hold the Senate floor in order to prevent action 
on a bill. 
In the early years of Congress, representatives as well as senators could use the 
filibuster technique. As the House grew in numbers, however, it was necessary to revise 
House rules to limit debate. In the smaller Senate, unlimited debate continued [sic], since 
senators believed any member should have the right to speak as long as necessary. 
In 1841, when the Democratic minority hoped to block a bank bill promoted by 
Henry Clay, Clay threatened to change Senate rules to allow the majority to close debate. 
Thomas Hart Benton angrily rebuked his colleague, accusing Clay of trying to stifle the 
11
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an attempt to break the filibuster, via a cloture vote, failed by 11 votes.48  
Despite its failed progress, a further vote on S. 11 was expected in the 
fall of 2003.  It should be noted that some Senate Republicans 
immediately hedged their bets, stating that in the event the Senate does 
not pass S. 11, they will pursue “targeted amendments” aimed at 
relieving specific medical specialties, including obstetricians and 
emergency room physicians.49 
D.  The Unites States General Accounting Office Study 
In the spring of 2003, a number of House Republicans supporting 
limited medical malpractice damage awards requested a United States 
General Accounting Office (GAO) study.  In response thereto, the GAO 
 
Senate’s right to unlimited debate. Unlimited debate remained in place in the Senate 
until 1917. At that time, at the suggestion of President Woodrow Wilson, the Senate 
adopted a rule (Rule 22) that allowed the Senate to end a debate with a two-thirds 
majority vote—a tactic known as “cloture.” 
The new Senate rule was put to the test in 1919, when the Senate invoked cloture 
to end a filibuster against the Treaty of Versailles. Despite the new cloture rule, however, 
filibusters continued to be an effective means to block legislation, due in part to the fact 
that a two-thirds majority vote is difficult to obtain. Over the next several decades, the 
Senate tried numerous times to evoke cloture, but failed to gain the necessary two-thirds 
vote. Filibusters were particularly useful to southern senators blocking civil rights 
legislation in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In 1975, the Senate reduced the number of votes 
required for cloture from two-thirds (67) to three-fifths (60) of the 100 member Senate. 
Id. 
 47. S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ 
z?d108:SN00011:@@@L&summ 2=m&.  Following its introduction, the bill proceeded along the 
following course: 
6/27/2003:  Introduced in the Senate. Read the first time. Placed on Senate Legislative 
Calendar under Read the First Time.  Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative 
Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 186. 
7/7/2003:  Motion to proceed to consideration of measure made in Senate (consideration: 
CR S8871-8893, S8893-8894).  Cloture motion on the motion to proceed to the measure 
presented in Senate (The motion to invoke cloture was filed by United States Senator 
from Tennessee, and Senator Majority Leader William H. Frist, M.D., a former organ 
transplant surgeon.).   
7/8/2003:  Motion to proceed to measure considered in Senate (consideration: CR 
S9001-9009, S9010-9043). 
7/9/2003:  Motion to proceed to measure considered in Senate (consideration: CR 
S9061-9083).  Cloture on the motion to proceed to the measure not invoked in Senate by 
Yea-Nay Vote. 49-48. Record Vote Number: 264 (consideration: CR S9083) (The 
cloture rule-Rule 22-is the only formal procedure that Senate rules provide for breaking a 
filibuster. http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Cloture_vrd.htm). 
Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Press Release, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, G.O.P. Focuses on Medical Malpractice 
Caps, http://www.jsonline. com/news/nat/ap/sep03/ap-congress-malpra090503.asp (September 5, 
2003). 
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conducted an extensive analysis of the various factors that have 
contributed to the dramatic increase in medical malpractice liability 
insurance rates over the past four years.50  The results of the GAO’s 
study were released in June of 2003.  According to the GAO, the study 
was performed because: 
Over the past several years, large increases in medical malpractice 
insurance premium rates have raised concerns that physicians will no 
longer be able to afford malpractice insurance and will be forced to 
curtail or discontinue providing certain services.  Additionally, a lack 
of profitability has led some large insurers to stop selling medical 
malpractice insurance, furthering concerns that physicians will not be 
able to obtain coverage.  To help Congress better understand the 
reasons behind the rate increases, the GAO undertook a study to (1) 
describe the extent of the increases in medical malpractice insurance 
rates, (2) analyze the factors that contributed to those increases, and (3) 
identify changes in the medical malpractice market that might make 
this period of rising premium rates different from previous such 
periods.51 
Ultimately, the GAO found that: 
Multiple factors, including falling investment income and rising 
reinsurance costs, have contributed to recent increases in premium 
rates in our sample states.52 However, GAO found that losses on 
medical malpractice claims—which make up the largest part of 
insurers’ costs—appear to be the primary driver of rate increases in the 
long run.  And while losses for the entire industry have shown 
persistent upward trend, insurers’ loss experiences have varied 
dramatically across our sample states, resulting in wide variations in 
premium rates.  In addition, factors other than losses can affect 
premium rates in the short run, exacerbating cycles within the medical 
malpractice market.  For example, high investment income or 
adjustments to account for lower than expected losses may legitimately 
permit insurers to price insurance below the expected cost of paying 
 
 50. United States General Accounting Office [GAO], Medical Malpractice Insurance: 
Multiple Factors Have Contributed to Increased Premium Rates, 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf (June, 2003). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  These sample states included: California, Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas.  Id.  According to the GAO: 
[This m]ix of states [was] based on the following characteristics: extent of any recent 
increases in premium rates, status as a “crisis state” according to the American medical 
Association, presence of caps on non-economic damages, state population, and aggregate 
loss ratios for medical malpractice insurers within the state. 
Id. 
13
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claims.  However, because of  the long lag between collecting 
premiums and paying claims, underlying losses may be increasing 
while insurers are holding premium rates down, requiring large 
premium rate hikes when the increasing trend in losses is recognized.  
While these factors may explain some events in the medical 
malpractice market, the GAO could not fully analyze the composition 
and causes of losses at the insurer level owing to a lack of 
comprehensive data.53 
GAO’s analysis also showed that the medical malpractice market has 
changed considerably since previous hard markets.  Physician-owned 
and/or operated insurers now cover around 60 percent of the market, 
self-insurance has become more widespread, and states have passed 
laws designated to reduce premium rates.  As a result, it is not clear 
how premium rates might behave during soft or hard markets.54 
Furthermore, the GAO recommended that no “executive action”55 
be taken.  It did, however, suggest: 
[T]o further the understanding of conditions in current and future 
medical malpractice markets, Congress may wish to consider 
encouraging the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and 
state insurance regulators to identify and collect additional, mutually 
beneficial data necessary for evaluating the medical malpractice 
insurance market.56 
As to the issue of availability to medical care, the GAO found that 
there were “localized but not widespread access problems,”57 however, it 
added that these particular instances were often in rural locations where 
keeping physicians has always been a problem.58 
Finally, GAO investigators found that the reports of physicians 
moving to other states, retiring, or closing practices in response to the 
purported “crisis” complained of by the AMA were, in fact, not 
 
 53. Id.  More specifically, in addition to claims, the GAO found that rate increases were 
caused by the following three factors: 
(1) decreases in investment income as interest rates form bonds decreased; (2) 
competition for market shares that “for some insurers” did not cover their ultimate losses 
on that business and; (3) reinsurance rates increased rapidly, starting in 2001, raising 
insurers’ overall costs. 
See Massachusetts Medical Society Online, GAO Reports on Causes of Medical Malpractice Rate 
Increases, http://www.massmed.org/pages/GAO_report_July_2003.asp (August 1, 2003). 
 54. GAO, supra note 50. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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accurate.59 
Despite the results of the GAO study, the GOP is expected to move 
forward in its quest for federal medical malpractice caps.60 
IV.   THE STATES’ APPROACH 
“Since 1975, 19 states have implemented these caps at various 
levels ranging from $250,000.00 to $1 million.”61  A more detailed 
analysis of how each state and the District of Columbia has dealt with 
the issue of caps in medical malpractice liability cases is set forth below. 
 
 59. GAO, supra note 50. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Weiss Ratings, supra, note 2 and accompanying text.  The following chart is 
excerpted from the Weiss Ratings study.  This chart sets forth those states that have enacted caps in 
medical malpractice liability actions. 
 State Cap ($) Year Adopted 
Alaska 500,000 19972 
California 250,000 1975 
Colorado 250,000 1998 
Hawaii 375,000 1976 
Idaho 682,000 1990* 
Indiana 1,000,000 1990 
Kansas 250,000 1994 
Louisiana 500,000 1975 
Maryland 805,000 1986* 
Massachusetts 500,000 1997 
Michigan 624,000 1993* 
Missouri 547,000 1988* 
Montana 250,000 1997 
New Mexico 600,000 1996 
North Dakota 500,000 1996 
Utah 250,000 1996 
Virginia 1,000,000 1992 
West Virginia 1,000,000 1986 
Wisconsin 350,000 1995*3 
*Caps are adjusted annually for inflation. 
 
Alaska’s cap applies to incidents occurring before August 1997. Id.  After August 1997: the cap is 
the greater of $400,000 or life expectancy times $8,000 except in the case of severe disfigurement 
or physical impairment in which the cap is the greater of $1 million or life expectancy times 
$25,000.  Id. 
Wisconsin’s cap applies to damages from all health care providers except in wrongful death cases. 
Id.  Damages in wrongful death are limited to $500,000 for the death of a minor and $350,000 for 
the death of an adult.  Id. 
15
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A.  Alabama 
The Alabama legislature passed the Medical Liability Act of 1987 
to limit a plaintiff’s recovery in a medical malpractice suit to $400,000, 
including punitive damages.62  The Alabama Supreme Court, however, 
held the statute to be unconstitutional, but the statute has not been 
repealed.63  The Court has also held to be unconstitutional a $250,000 
cap on punitive damages,64 applicable to all cases except wrongful death 
and those alleging a pattern of intentional wrongful conduct, actual 
malice, or defamation.65  The legislature has since addressed the issue 
and passed a cap on punitive damages in all civil actions to not exceed 
compensatory damages or $500,000, whichever is greater.66  Except, 
when the claim is for wrongful death or physical injury, punitive 
damages shall not exceed $1,500,000.67 
 
 62. ALA. CODE § 6-5-544 (2003) (stating, “plaintiff shall not seek recovery in any amount 
greater than the amounts described herein for noneconomic losses”).  See generally, Symposium on 
Tort Reform: VIII. Medical Malpractice: A Plaintiff Attorney’s Perspective, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 515 
(1994) (reviewing specific provisions from the Medical Liability Act of 1987 that apply to the 
medical profession); Symposium on Tort Reform: IX. Medical Malpractice: A Defense Attorney’s 
Perspective, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 531 (1994) (criticizing the Alabama Supreme Court for overruling 
the $400,000 damage cap in Moore v. Mobile Infirmity Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991)). 
 63. See Moore v. Mobile Infirmity Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991).  The Alabama 
Supreme Court reasoned, the correlation between the damage caps and “the reduction of health care 
costs to the citizens of Alabama was, at best, indirect and remote.”  Id. at 168.  The court went on to 
conclude that the unfair burden placed on “catastrophically injured victims of medical malpractice 
against the indirect and speculative benefit that may be conferred upon society, represents an 
unreasonable exercise of police power.” Id. at 170.  Therefore, the section violates the equal 
protection component of the Constitution of Alabama.  Id.  Another section of the Medical Liability 
Act of 1987 was § 6-5-547, which attempted to place a 1,000,000 limit on wrongful death actions 
brought against health care providers.  ALA. CODE § 6-5-547 (2003).  The Alabama Supreme Court, 
however, declared this section unconstitutional because it was similar to Moore v. Mobile Infirmity 
Ass’n as unreasonable “class legislation.”  Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995) (overruled 
on different grounds in Ex parte Apicella, 809 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 2001)). 
 64. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Alabama, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ alabama.html (revised May 17, 1998); see Moore , 592 So.2d at 156; Ala. 
Code § 6-11-21 (1993). 
 65. Id.; see Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993). 
 66. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2003).  The statute lists three exceptions where the punitive 
damage cap does not apply: in an action against a small business defendant, punitive damages shall 
not exceed $50,000 or 10% of the business’ net worth; in actions for wrongful death or intentional 
infliction of physical injury, punitive damages shall not exceed three times compensatory damages 
or $1,500,000.  Id. 
 67. Id.  The Alabama legislature rewrote §6-11-21 in 1999 to provide caps on punitive 
damages to apply “in all civil actions”, but listed three situations when the punitive damage cap 
does not apply.  Mobile Infirmary Medical Ctr. v. Hodgen, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 338, *30 (Ala. 2003).  
This was in response to the Alabama Supreme Court declaring the old version, which placed a 
general cap on punitive damages, unconstitutional in Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 
878 (Ala. 1993).  Id.  § 6-11-21 as amended “has been recognized as a complete replacement of the 
16
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A series of judicial decisions holds that all damages in wrongful 
death cases are considered punitive, and not compensatory.68  Punitive 
damages may be awarded in cases of simple negligence, with no 
requirement of willful or wanton behavior by defendants.69 The punitive 
damages are assessed jointly and severally against all liable defendants, 
regardless of their degrees of culpability, and with no right of 
contribution.70 The awarding of punitive damages for simple negligence 
has been upheld as constitutional under state law, case law, and federal 
law.71 
B.  Alaska 
In an action to recover damages for personal injury based on 
negligence, accruing before August 7, 1997, damages for non-economic 
losses are limited to compensation for pain, suffering, inconvenience, 
physical impairment, and loss of enjoyment of life, and are limited to 
$500,000 per plaintiff.72  The $500,000 limit does not apply to damage 
awards for severe disfigurement or physical impairment.73 
In an action to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful 
death, accruing on or after August 7, 1997, all damage claims for non-
economic losses are limited to compensation for pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of 
life, and loss of consortium.74  The amount of the basic cap is the greater 
of $400,000 or the plaintiff’s life expectancy, in years, multiplied by 
$8,000.75  In a personal injury action, when the damages are awarded for 
severe permanent physical impairment or severe disfigurement, damages 
 
old statutory restrictions on punitive damages.”  Id.  In Hodgen, the Court ultimately upheld the 
statute by affirming the trial court’s judgment on the condition that it was lowered to meet the 
$1,500,000 punitive damage cap.  Id. 
 68. McCullough, Alabama, supra note 64; see Savannah & Memphis R.R. v. Schearer, 58 
Ala. 672, 680 (Ala. 1877); Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. 1988); Killough v. 
Jahandarfard, 578 So. 2d 1041 (Ala. 1991) (minor decedent). Alabama’s wrongful death statutes do 
not indicate this treatment by the courts. McCullough, Alabama, supra note 64; see Ala. Code § 6-
5-391 (Supp. 1997) (for minors); § 6-5-410 (1993). 
 69. McCullough, Alabama, supra note 64; see Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So. 2d 
1249 (Ala. 1986). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.; see Killough v. Jahandarfard, 578 So. 2d 1041 (Ala. 1991); see Louis Pizitz Dry 
Goods Co. v. Weldell, 274 U.S. 112 (1927). 
 72. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (Michie 1996); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of 
Medical Malpractice Law: Alaska, http://www.mcandl.com/alaska.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
 73. Id. 
 74. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (Michie 1997); McCullough, Alaska, supra note 72. 
 75. Id. 
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may not exceed the greater of $1,000,000 or the plaintiff’s life 
expectancy, in years, multiplied by $25,000.76  The amended statute 
clarifies that multiple injuries sustained by one claimant resulting from 
one incident are treated as a single injury, invoking only one cap, and 
that consortium claims do not open up a second cap.77 
Alaska also has a new cap on punitive damages, applicable to 
claims accruing on or after August 7, 1997.78  Ordinarily punitive 
damages will be limited to the greater of three times the compensatory 
damages awarded to the plaintiff or $500,000.79  However, if the 
defendant was motivated by financial gain and the adverse consequences 
of his conduct were actually known, the limit is the greatest of four times 
the compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff, four times the 
financial gain that the defendant received, or $7,000,000.80 
C.  Arizona 
Arizona does not place a cap on the amount of damages recoverable 
in a medical malpractice action.81  The Arizona constitution prohibits 
enacting any law that limits the damages recoverable for personal injury 
or death.82 
D.  Arkansas 
Although Arkansas does not have a provision that specifically 
limits the amount of damages in a medical malpractice action, the 
legislature passed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, which places a 
limit on punitive damages.83  Judgments for plaintiffs in medical 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Michie 2003); McCullough, Alaska, supra note 72.  The 
finder of fact first must determine if punitive damages are allowed in the action. ALASKA STAT. § 
09.17.020 (Michie 2003).  To award punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant’s conduct was either outrageous, including acts done with 
malice or bad motive, or evidenced reckless indifference to the interest of another person.  Id.  After 
it has been determined that punitive damages can be awarded, a separate proceeding must be 
conducted to determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded.  Id. 
 79. Id.; McCullough, Alaska, supra note 72. 
 80. Id. 
 81. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Arizona, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ arizona.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
 82. ARIZ. CONST. of 1911, art. II, § 31. 
 83. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208 (2003).  The statute places a punitive damage limit of “(1) 
$250,000 or (2) three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the action, not to 
exceed $1,000,000.”  Id.  The statute creates an exception to when the section will not apply—when 
the fact finder “(1) determines by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time of the injury, the 
18
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malpractice actions that exceed $100,000 are to be paid by periodic 
payments as determined by the court, rather than by a lump sum 
payment.84  All medical malpractice injury cases must be brought within 
two years after the cause of action accrues.85 
E.  California 
In California, damages for non-economic losses, defined as 
compensation for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, 
disfigurement and other non-pecuniary injury, are limited to $250,000.86  
The cap applies whether the action is for personal injury or wrongful 
death, allowing only one $250,000 recovery in a wrongful death case.87  
There is authority for allowing separate caps for the patient and a spouse 
claiming loss of consortium.88  The cap on non-economic damages has 
been held to be constitutional.89 
F.  Colorado 
Damages for medical malpractice against a hospital or physician 
may not exceed $1,000,000 per patient, including any claim for 
derivative non-economic loss or injury by any other claimant.90 Not 
more than $250,000 may be attributable to non-economic loss or 
injury.91  However, if the court finds that the future economic damages 
 
defendant intentionally pursued a course of conduct for the purpose of causing injury or damage; 
and (2) determines that the defendant’s conduct did, in fact, harm the plaintiff.”  Id. 
 84. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-208 (2003).  The statute states that damages may include 
compensation for actual economic losses including “the cost of reasonable and necessary medical 
services, rehabilitation services, custodial care, loss of services, and loss of earnings or earning 
capacity.”  Id. 
 85. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (2003).  If the medical injury involves a foreign object in 
the body that could not have reasonably been discovered, the action can be brought within one year 
from the date of discovery.  Id. 
 86. CAL. CIVIL CODE §3333.2 (West 1997). For a more detailed analysis of California’s 
medical malpractice cap law, see § V, infra. 
 87. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: California, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ california.html (revised February 6, 1998); see Yates v. Pollock, 239 Cal. 
Rptr. 383 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1987). 
 88. Id.; see Atkins v. Strayhorn, 273 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1990). 
 89. Id.; see Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (also upholding the 
modification of the collateral source rule). 
 90. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302 (West 1997); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, 
Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Colorado, http://www.mcandl.com/ colorado.html (revised 
February 6, 1998). 
 91. Id.  Effective July 1, 2003, this damages limitation increases to $300,000, to adjust for 
inflation, applying to acts or omissions occurring on or after July 1, 2003. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-64-302 (West 1997). 
19
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exceed this cap, and to impose the limitation would be unfair, it may 
award damages in excess of the limit.92  This damage cap was held to be 
constitutional in Scholz v. Metropolitan Pathologists, P.C.93  The court 
also held that the medical malpractice damage cap superceded the 
general statutory cap applicable to other types of cases.94 
Punitive damages may not exceed the amount of actual damages 
awarded.95  However, the court may increase the punitive damage award 
to an amount three times the amount of actual damages if the defendant 
has continued the behavior or repeated the action which is the subject of 
the claim in a willful and wanton manner, or if the defendant has further 
aggravated the plaintiff’s damages by acting in a willful and wanton 
manner during the pendency of the action.96  Punitive damages shall not 
be imposed when the injury results from the use of an approved drug or 
product used in accordance with standards of prudent health care 
professionals.97 
G.  Connecticut 
Connecticut does not impose a cap on damages recoverable in 
medical malpractice actions.98 
H.  Delaware 
Delaware does not place a limit on the damages a claimant may 
recover.99 
I.  District of Columbia 
The District of Columbia does not place a cap on the amount of 
damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action.100 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993). 
 94. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5 (West 1997). 
 95. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (West 1997); McCullough, Colorado, supra note 
90. 
 96. Id. 
 97. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302.5 (West 1997); McCullough, Colorado, supra note 
90. 
 98. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Connecticut, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ connecticut (revised February 6, 1998). 
 99. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Delaware, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ delaware (revised February 6, 1998). 
 100. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: District of 
Columbia, http://www. mcandl.com/dc.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
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J.  Florida 
After an acrimonious battle between Florida Governor Jeb Bush 
and the Florida State Senate in the past legislative session, the Florida 
House and Senate finally reached agreement on medical malpractice 
reform: 
The disagreement began with the Governor and the House insisting 
upon a $250,000.00 cap on non-economic damages, and the Senate 
being critical of any cap on damages. Subsequently, the House 
increased its proposed cap to $1 million, with the Senate deciding to 
back a “pierceable” cap. The “pierceable” cap would allow non-
economic damages to be granted in the range of $250,000.00 to $1 
million, but would allow the collection of up to $4 million dollars in 
cases of catastrophic injury or death.101 
The compromise bill passed the legislature on August 13, 2003.102  
Essentially, the bill caps non-economic damages at $500,000 per 
physician and $750,000 per hospital or healthcare facility.103  There are 
two important exceptions: 
The first exception provides more protection for emergency room 
physicians, capping their non-economic damages at $150,000.00 per 
physician and $300,000.00 total (from all practitioners). The second 
exception allows malpractice victims in the most egregious cases to 
collect a total of $2.5 million in non-economic damages — $1 million 
from physicians (by suing multiple doctors) and $1.5 million from 
hospitals or other health care facilities (by suing multiple facilities).104 
Generally, punitive damages may not exceed the greater of three 
times the claimant’s compensatory damages or $500,000.105  If the fact 
finder determines that the wrongful conduct was motivated solely by 
unreasonable financial gain and the unreasonably dangerous nature of 
the conduct was actually known by the defendant, it may award punitive 
damages not to exceed the greater of four times the amount of 
compensatory damages or $2,000,000.106  Furthermore, if the fact finder 
determines that at the time of the injury the defendant had a specific 
 
 101. American Osteopathic Association, State Government Affairs: Florida Passes PLI Reform 
Legislation, http://www.aoa-net.org/Government/stateaffairs/floridaupdate.htm (August 2003). 
 102. Id.  The compromise bill is the common name of Senate Bill 2d and House Bill 1d.  Id 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. FLA. STAT. ANN. §768.73 (West 1999). 
 106. Id. 
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intent to harm the claimant, then there is no cap on punitive damages.107 
In addition to its new law, which imposes caps, Florida’s voluntary 
arbitration scheme also provides a cap on non-economic damages under 
certain circumstances.108  Florida provides that a court may require, upon 
motion of either party, that the claim be submitted to non-binding 
arbitration.109  There is also a process where the parties can submit to 
voluntary binding arbitration.110 
A proceeding for voluntary binding arbitration is an alternative to a 
jury trial.111  The Florida system provides that parties may submit to 
voluntary binding arbitration for the determination of damages, which 
gives the defendant an option to limit non-economic damages in return 
for admitting liability.112 Once this option is chosen, it is the exclusive 
means by which to seek recovery.113  If a defendant refuses to accept the 
claimant’s offer to arbitrate, the claimant, if successful at trial, is entitled 
to pre-judgment interest and up to 25 percent of the award in attorneys’ 
fees.114  If a claimant refuses to accept a defendant’s offer to arbitrate, 
his recovery will be limited to economic damages, including past and 
future medical expenses and 80 percent of lost wages, plus no more than 
$350,000 in non-economic damages.115  If the claimant accepts the offer 
to arbitrate, recovery will be limited to economic damage, including past 
and future medical expenses and 80 percent of lost wages, plus no more 
than $250,000 in non-economic damages, plus attorneys’ fees.116  The 
damage cap in the arbitration statute has been held to be 
constitutional.117  A state appellate court decision held that an arbitrator 
can award no more than $250,000 for a single wrongful death claim, 
regardless of the number of claimants.118  The Florida supreme court 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Medical Malpractice Law: Florida, 
http://www.mcandl.com/florida.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
 109. FLA. STAT. ANN §766.107 (West 1997). 
 110. FLA. STAT. ANN §766.207 (West 2003). 
 111. FLA. STAT. ANN §766.209 (West 2003).  If neither party requests or agrees to voluntary 
binding arbitration, the claim proceeds to trial.  Id. 
 112. FLA. STAT. ANN §766.209 (West 2003); McCullough, Florida, supra note 108.  Upon the 
completion of a pre-suit investigation with preliminary reasonable ground for a medical negligence 
claim, the parties may elect to have damages determined through binding arbitration. FLA. STAT. 
ANN §766.209 (West 2003). 
 113. McCullough, Florida, supra note 108. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. FLA. STAT. ANN §766.209 (West 2003); McCullough, Florida supra note 108. 
 117. University of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 915 
(1993); McCullough, Florida, supra note 108. 
 118. St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Phillipe, 699 So.2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); McCullough, 
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found that the cap on non-economic damages of $250,000 per incident in 
a voluntary arbitration under § 766.207 applies to each claimant.119 
K.  Georgia 
Georgia does not place a cap on the amount of compensatory 
damages that may be awarded.120  However, punitive damages are 
capped at $250,000, unless the claimant can successfully demonstrate 
that the defendant had an intent to harm.121 
L.  Hawaii 
Hawaii limits damages recoverable for pain and suffering to 
$375,000.122  This limitation does not apply to intentional torts, torts 
relating to environmental pollution, toxic and asbestos related torts, torts 
relating to aircraft accidents, or strict and products liability torts.123 
M.  Idaho 
Non-economic damages for personal injury or wrongful death may 
not exceed $250,000.124  The $250,000 cap has been adjusted on July 1 
of each year since 1988 by the rate of increase or decrease in average 
wages in Idaho.125  The limitation on non-economic damage awards is 
inapplicable to causes of action arising out of willful or reckless 
misconduct and to causes of action arising out of acts constituting a 
felony under state or federal law.126  Punitive damages are not to exceed 
the greater of $250,000 or an amount which is three times the 
compensatory damages.127  In addition, Idaho law gives judges more 
power than the law of most states to reduce damages that are 
unsupported or unjustified, or is so unreasonably disproportionate to the 
 
Florida, supra note 108. 
 119. St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Phillipe, 769 So.2d 961 (Fla. 2000). 
 120. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Georgia, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ georgia.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
 121. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (1992); McCullough, Georgia, supra note 120. 
 122. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 (1995); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of 
Medical Malpractice Law: Hawaii, http://www.mcandl.com/ hawaii.html (revised February 6, 
1998). 
 123. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9  (1995). 
 124. IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (Michie 2003). 
 125. IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (Michie 2003).  McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of 
Medial Malpractice Law: Idaho, http://www.mcandl.com/idaho.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
 126. Id. 
 127. IDAHO CODE § 6-1604 (Michie 2003). 
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loss or damage suffered to be unconscionable.128 
N.  Illinois 
Illinois has no cap on compensatory damages, but punitive damages 
are not allowed.129  In 1995, the Illinois legislature passed a $500,000 
limit on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases, but this 
was specifically held unconstitutional in Best v. Taylor Machine 
Works.130  The Best decision did not invalidate a pre-existing statute 
prohibiting punitive damages in medical malpractice cases.131 
O.  Indiana 
The limits on recoveries in medical malpractice claims against 
qualified providers have increased substantially under new legislation 
scheduled to take effect in cases arising out of acts of malpractice that 
occur on or after July 1, 1999.132  For claims accruing prior to January 1, 
1990, the total amount recoverable for an injury or death of a patient 
may not exceed $500,000.133  As of January 1, 1990, the maximum 
recoverable was increased to $750,000.134  For claims accruing on or 
after July 1, 1999, the total cap on damages against all is $1,250,000.135  
A health care provider qualified under the statute is not liable for an 
amount in excess of $250,000.136  The original version of the cap was 
held to be constitutional in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital.137 
P.  Iowa 
Iowa does not place a cap on the amount of damages recoverable in 
a medical malpractice action.138 
 
 128. IDAHO CODE § 6-807 (Michie 1997). 
 129. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Illinois, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ illinois.html (revised August 31, 2002); see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 
5/2-1115.1 (West Supp. 2002).  In all cases where the plaintiff seeks damages for medical or 
hospital malpractice, no punitive damages are allowed.  Id. 
 130. 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). 
 131. Id.; see 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/2-1115 (West 1992). 
 132. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Indiana, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ indiana.html (revised July 30, 1999). 
 133. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West Supp. 1998); McCullough, Indiana  supra note 132. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. 404 N.E.2d 585, 598-602 (Ind. 1980); McCullough, Indiana, supra note 132. 
 138. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Iowa, 
http://www.mcandl.com/iowa. html (revised February 6, 1998). 
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Q.  Kansas 
In any personal injury action, non-economic damages are limited to 
a total of $250,000 per plaintiff as against all defendants.139  If the action 
is tried to a jury, the court should not instruct the jury about this 
limitation, and if the jury awards non-economic damages in excess of the 
limit, the judge should enter an award of $250,000.140  This statute has 
been interpreted to mean that separate claims brought within a single 
action should be aggregated under the cap, not treated separately.141  In 
wrongful death actions, damages are limited to $250,000, except for 
pecuniary loss sustained by an heir at law.142  Both of these limitations  
have been upheld as constitutional.143  The Supreme Court of Kansas 
held that statutes setting an absolute cap in medical malpractice actions, 
rather than a cap on non-pecuniary damages only, were unconstitutional 
in Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell.144 
In any civil action, punitive damages are limited to the lesser of the 
defendant’s highest gross income for the prior five years or 
$5,000,000.145  If the court determines this amount is clearly inadequate 
to penalize the defendant, the court may award up to 50 percent of the 
net worth of the defendant.146  If the court finds the profitability of the 
defendant’s misconduct exceeds the limitation, the limitation on that 
amount of punitive damages which the court may award shall be an 
amount equal to one and one half times the profit instead.147  The judge, 
not the jury, determines the amount of punitive damages.148  Punitive 
damages are not available in a wrongful death case.149 
 
 139. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (1994); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of 
Medical Malpractice Law: Kansas, http://www.mcandl.com/kansas.html (revised September 4, 
2002). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Hoover v. Innovative Health of Kansas, Inc., 988 P.2d 287 (Kan. 1999); McCullough, 
Kansas, supra note 139. 
 142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (Supp. 2001); McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139. 
 143. Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv., Inc., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990); Leiker v. Gafford, 778 
P.2d 823 (Kan. 1989); McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139. 
 144. 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988); McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139. 
 145. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702 (1994); McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139. 
 146. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702 (1994). 
 147. Id; McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Smith v. Printup, 938 P.2d 1261 (Kan. 1997) (also holding statute constitutional); 
McCullough, Kansas, supra note 139. 
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R.  Kentucky 
Kentucky does not impose a statutory cap on damages recoverable 
in medical malpractice actions.150 
S.  Louisiana 
In Louisiana, there is no damage cap for those not insured by the 
state, but qualified health care providers have their liability limited to 
$100,000.151  Punitive damages are not recoverable in Louisiana, except 
as specifically authorized by statute.152 
T.  Maine 
Maine does not impose a cap on the amount of damages that may 
be collected in a medical malpractice action.153  Non-economic damages 
in a wrongful death action are limited to $400,000 and punitive damages 
are limited to $75,000.154 
U.  Maryland 
Maryland limits non-economic damages for any personal injury 
cause of action for medical malpractice accruing after July 1, 1986.155  
The limit was originally $350,000, but for causes of actions arising on or 
after October 1, 1994, the limit has been increased to $500,000.156  
Beginning October 1, 1995, and every October 1 thereafter, the limit on 
non-economic damages is increased by $15,000.157  Non-economic 
damages in personal injury actions include pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, 
and other non-pecuniary damages, but not punitive damages.158  The cap 
 
 150. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Kentucky, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ kentucky (revised February 6, 1998). 
 151. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Louisiana, 
http://www.mcandl.com/louisiana.html (revised February 6, 1998); see Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co., 645 
So.2d 604 (La. 1994). 
 152. Id. 
 153. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Maine, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ maine.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
 154. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (West 1999). 
 155. MD. CODE ANN., Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 11-108 (Supp. 1997); McCullough, Campbell & 
Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Maryland, http://www.mcandl.com/maryland.html 
(revised February 6, 1998). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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on non-economic damages applies to each “direct victim” of the tort and 
all those claiming injury by or through him.159  The statute has been 
found not to violate Maryland’s constitution.160 
Prior to the 1994 amendment, the statute had been found not to 
apply to wrongful death cases.161  However, the statute now provides 
that the cap applies to wrongful death cases, and that the total recovery 
of all beneficiaries in a wrongful death case cannot exceed 150 percent 
of the cap.162 
V.  Massachusetts 
In Massachusetts, in a medical malpractice case, the jury is 
instructed that if it finds the defendant liable, it is not to award the 
plaintiff more than $500,000 for pain and suffering, loss of 
companionship, embarrassment, and other items of general damages, 
unless it determines that there is 
a substantial or permanent loss or impairment of a bodily function or 
substantial disfigurement, or other special circumstances in the case 
which warrant a finding that imposition of such a limitation would 
deprive the plaintiff of just compensation for the injuries sustained.163 
W.  Michigan 
Michigan limits non-economic damages, including pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, physical impairment, and physical disfigurement, in a 
medical malpractice action.164  The maximum for all plaintiffs, resulting 
from the negligence of all defendants, was set at $280,000 in 1993.165  In 
instances of paralysis due to brain or spinal cord injury, impairment of 
cognitive capacity, or loss of reproductive ability, in which case the limit 
 
 159. Oaks v. Connors, 660 A.2d 423 (Md. 1995) (a single cap applies to the injured person’s 
claim and the spouse’s consortium claim); McCullough, Maryland, supra note 155. 
 160. Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992); McCullough, Maryland, supra note 155. 
 161. United States v. Streidel, 620 A.2d 905 (Md. 1993); McCullough, Maryland, supra note 
155. 
 162. MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-108 (Supp. 1997); McCullough, Maryland, supra 
note 155. 
 163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (West 2000).  This standard can often be met, so the 
cap should not be relied on.  Id.  McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice 
Law: Massachusetts, http://www.mcandl.com/massachusetts.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
 164. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West 1996); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, 
Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Michigan, http://www.mcandl.com/michigan.html (revised 
August 31, 2002). 
 165. Id. 
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was $500,000.166  These caps are increased annually with the cost of 
living, and as of 2002 were $349,700 and $624,500.167  The jury is not to 
be advised of the damage limits, but any jury award in excess of these 
amounts must be reduced by the court.168 
The current statutory caps apply only to causes of action arising on 
or after April 1, 1994.169  The statute, before it was amended in 1994, 
had a major exception to the cap, including death or loss of a vital bodily 
function, and the latter exception was interpreted broadly.170  The 
statutory cap on non-economic damages was held constitutional.171  The 
current statute makes no specific reference to wrongful death, and it has 
been held that the wrongful death act governs, precluding the application 
of the medical malpractice cap.172 
X.  Minnesota 
Minnesota has not enacted a cap on the damages that can be 
awarded in a medical malpractice case.173 
Y.  Mississippi 
In October 2002, Mississippi enacted a law capping non-economic 
damages for claims for causes of action filed before July 1, 2011, at 
$500,000.174  For claims for causes of action filed on or after July 1, 
2011, but before July 1, 2017, the limit increases to $750,000.175  For 
claims for causes of action filed on or after July 1, 2017, the limit 
increase to $1,000,000.176  The statutory scheme requires cases to be 
filed only in the county where the cause of action occurred, shortening 
the statute of limitations for suing nursing homes from three to two 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304(5) (West 2000); McCullough, Michigan, supra 
note 164. 
 169. Tobin v. Provid. Mem’l Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 548 (Mich. 2001); McCullough, Michigan, 
supra note 164. 
 170. Lewis v. Krogol, 582 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied 598 N.W.2d 632 
(Mich. 1999); McCullough, Michigan, supra note 164. 
 171. Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). 
 172. Jenkins v. Patel, 662 N.W.2d 453 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). 
 173. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Minnesota, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ minnesota (revised February 6, 1998). 
 174. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (2003); Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics and 
Insurance Issues: Medical Malpractice, http://www.iii.org/ media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal/ 
(September 2003). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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years, and other provisions.177 
Z.  Missouri 
In any medical malpractice action for damages for personal injury 
or death, a claimant’s recovery of non-economic damages from any one 
defendant is limited by statute.178  The limitation amount is adjusted on 
January 1 of each year in accordance with a standard index of 
inflation.179  For 2004, the cap was approximately $565,000 from any 
one defendant.180  The cap is calculated annually by the Director of the 
Division of Insurance and published in the Missouri Register.181  The 
damage cap, together with other tort reform measures, has been held to 
be constitutional.182 
It should be noted, “[f]ollowing Missouri Governor Bob Holden’s 
[recent] veto of a tort reform bill that contained a number of provisions 
unrelated to medical malpractice, the Missouri State Medical 
Association now says it would support legislation dealing solely with 
medical malpractice concerns.”183 
AA.  Montana 
For medical malpractice causes of action arising on or after October 
1, 1995, Montana limits the award for past and future damages for non-
economic loss to $250,000.184  Non-economic damages is defined as 
subjective, non-monetary loss, including but not limited to, physical and 
mental pain and suffering, emotional distress, inconvenience, loss from 
physical impairment or disfigurement, loss of companionship or 
consortium, and injury to reputation or humiliation.185  The cap applies 
only once to an injury even if caused by a series of acts and more than 
 
 177. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174. 
 178. MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (West 1988); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of 
Medical Malpractice Law: Missouri, http://www.mcandl.com/missouri.html (revised February 6, 
1998). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Missouri Register, Mo. Reg., Vol. 29, No. 6 (March 15, 2004). 
 181. MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (West 1988); McCullough, Missouri, supra note 178. 
 182. Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
991 (1992); McCullough, Missouri, supra note 178. 
 183. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174. 
 184. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (1997); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of 
Medical Malpractice Law: Montana, http://www.mcandl.com/montana.html (revised February 6, 
1998). 
 185. Id. 
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one health care provider.186  The jury is not instructed about the cap and 
any award that exceeds it is reduced by the court.187 
BB.  Nebraska 
Nebraska does not generally impose limits on compensatory 
damages in medical malpractice actions.188  Special rules apply to health 
care providers that qualify for state-sponsored excess insurance.189  It is 
a fundamental rule of law in Nebraska that punitive, vindictive, or 
exemplary damages are not allowed.190 
CC.  Nevada 
In May 2003, Nevada Gov. Kenny Guinn signed into law a bill that 
prohibits medical malpractice insurers from using any financial loss 
sustained through investments as justification for increasing premiums 
paid by doctors.191  The law also includes a provision that prohibits 
medical malpractice insurers from basing rates for obstetricians on the 
number of babies they deliver in a year.192 
In July 2002, the state passed Assembly Bill 1, limiting non-
economic damages to $355,000, adopting new joint and several liability 
standards for economic damages, and limiting physician liability in 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Nebraska, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ nebraska.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
 189. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2829 (1993). Nebraska provides an excess liability fund for the 
benefit of qualified health care providers. Id. To qualify for coverage by the excess liability fund, a 
health care provider must file proof of financial responsibility and pay a surcharge.  NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 44-2824 (Supp. 1996). Physicians establish their financial responsibility by obtaining 
professional liability insurance in the amount of $200,000 per occurrence and $600,000 in the 
aggregate. Id.  Hospitals establish their financial responsibility by obtaining insurance in the amount 
of $200,000 per occurrence and $1,000,000 in the aggregate. Id. Hospitals run by the University of 
Nebraska may prove financial responsibility by establishing a self-insurance trust.  NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 44-2827.01 (1993). Once a health care provider has qualified under the Act, the Act becomes the 
exclusive method of recovery, unless the claimant has elected in writing prior to treatment not to 
come under the provisions of the Act.  NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2821 and 44-2840 (1993 & Supp. 
1996).  The total amount recoverable under the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act for any 
occurrence resulting in injury or death is $1,250,000 (or $1,000,000 if the occurrence took place 
prior to 1993).  NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (1993). The liability of a single qualified health care 
provider is limited to $200,000 per patient. Id. The excess liability fund pays the damages in excess 
of $200,000 for each defendant, up to the amount of the cap. Id. 
 190. Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472 (Neb. 1975). 
 191. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174. 
 192. Id. 
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government and non-profit trauma facilities to $50,000.193 
DD.  New Hampshire 
The New Hampshire legislature has placed a $250,000 limitation on 
medical malpractice damages.194  The New Hampshire Supreme Court, 
however, has declared the medical malpractice damage cap 
unconstitutional.195  The legislature has also attempted to place an 
$875,000 limitation on personal injury actions,196 but the court overruled 
the statute.197  New Hampshire has outlawed punitive damages, unless 
punitive damages are expressly provided by statute.198 
Damages recoverable in a wrongful death action may not exceed 
$50,000, except where the party recovering is a spouse, child, parent, or 
any dependent relative.199  Damages are never awarded for loss of 
society and companionship in death cases, except that effective January 
1, 1998, such damages may be awarded to a surviving spouse, up to a 
limit of $150,000.200 
EE.  New Jersey 
New Jersey has recently been a hot bed for protest by physicians, 
with the issue of caps and insurance reform coming to a head following 
a physicians’ strike in 2003: 
In a shift of position, New Jersey, Insurance Commissioner Holly 
Bakke says that she favors dropping, for the time being, any attempt to 
cap non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases and supports 
subsidies to help doctors pay for their insurance. She also suggests that 
reimbursement for doctors needs attention, noting that while doctors 
used to be able to pass their insurance costs along to patients in the 
past, they can no longer do so because most are under contracts with 
 
 193. A.B. 1, 2002 Nevada Laws, 18th Sp. Sess. (Nev. 2002); Jerome Harleston, Medical 
Malpractice Tort Reform, http://www.cga.state.ct.us/2002/olrdata/ins/rpt/2002-R-0782.htm. 
 194. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1997). 
 195. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (holding the statute violates the state’s 
equal protection clause: “[It] arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminates in favor of the class of 
health care providers. Although the statute  may promote the legislative objective of containing 
health care costs, the potential cost to the general public and the actual cost to many medical 
malpractice plaintiffs is simply too high.”). 
 196. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508-4-d (1997). 
 197. See Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991) (concluding that the statute violates 
the equal protection component of the state’s constitution). 
 198. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-16 (2003). 
 199. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556-13 (1997). 
 200. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556-12 (Supp. 1997). 
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HMO’s. And she wants insurers to look more carefully at the fact that 
a small percentage of doctors are responsible for a disproportionate 
number of claims and that doctors in particularly risky specialties, e.g. 
obstetrics and neurosurgery, are penalized for taking on the risks. She 
noted that the medical malpractice insurance crisis has been slightly 
alleviated by the increasing number of claims-made policies now 
available in the state. An earlier proposal to set a $300,000.00 limit on 
insurers’ liability for non-economic damages in malpractice cases, with 
damage awards over $300,000.00 being paid from a fund created 
through a surcharge on doctors, lawyers and employers is dead.201 
Current law says that for actions filed on or after October 27, 1997, 
no defendant is liable for any punitive damages in any action for an 
amount in excess of five times the liability of that defendant for 
compensatory damages, or $350,000, whichever is greater.202 
FF.  New Mexico 
New Mexico created a statutory scheme which limited liability for 
health care providers that met qualification requirements.203  In medical 
malpractice actions against a qualified health care provider tried before a 
jury, a $600,000 limit applies to all damages, with the exception of 
punitive damages and damages for medical expenses.204  For incidents 
prior to April 1, 1995, the limit is $500,000.205  The $600,000 limit on 
damages does not include future medical expenses, which are not 
covered by monetary damages.206  If the jury finds that a plaintiff 
 
 201. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174. 
 202. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14(b) (West Supp. 1997); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, 
Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: New Jersey, http://www.mcandl.com/newjersey (revised 
February 6, 1998). 
 203. N. M. STAT. ANN. § § 41-5-5 and 41-5-6 (Michie 1996 and Supp. 1997). 
 204. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: New Mexico, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ newmexico.html (revised February 6, 1998).  Under New Mexico law, a 
patient’s compensation fund, established pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-25 (Michie Supp. 
1997), is financed by a surcharge on all qualified health care providers.  Id.  The excess over 
$200,000 per occurrence of any judgment obtained in a medical malpractice action against a 
qualified health care provider will be paid by the patient’s compensation fund.  N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 41-5-6 (Michie 1996); McCullough, New Mexico, supra.  However, the patient’s compensation 
fund does not cover a health care provider’s liability for punitive damages. Id.  To qualify under the 
plan, a health care provider must pay the surcharge and carry liability insurance with limits of 
$200,000 per occurrence or deposit an equivalent amount of security with the Superintendent of 
Insurance.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-5 (Michie 1996); McCullough, New Mexico, supra; see N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1996). 
 205. McCullough, New Mexico, supra note 204. 
 206. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-7 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1997); McCullough, New Mexico, 
supra note 204. 
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requires future medical care, the expense of that care must be paid as 
incurred.207 
GG.  New York 
New York does not limit the amount of damages recoverable in 
medical malpractice actions.208 
HH.  North Carolina 
North Carolina generally does not limit the compensatory damages 
recoverable in medical malpractice actions.209  However, for actions 
filed on or after January 1, 1996, punitive damages are limited to three 
times compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater.210 
II.  North Dakota 
In a wrongful death action or a physical injury action, the trier of 
fact may award compensation for economic and non-economic damages, 
but the statute does not explicitly limit either award.211  The court may 
review awards in excess of $250,000 for reasonableness upon request 
from the party responsible for the damages.212  The moving party must 
establish that the amount of economic damages awarded did not bear a 
reasonable relation to the economic damage incurred.213  If the court 
determines that the economic damages awarded were unreasonable, the 
court must reduce the award to “reasonable economic damages.”214 
For claims arising after April 1, 1995, there is a $500,000 cap on 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: New York, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ newyork (revised February 6, 1998). 
 209. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: North Carolina, 
http://www.mcandl. com/northcarolina.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
 210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (1995); McCullough, North Carolina, supra note 209. 
 211. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-04 (2003).  “Economic damages” refers to “damages arising 
from medical expenses, and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, loss of earnings 
and earning capacity, loss of income or support, burial costs, cost of substitute domestic services, 
loss of employment or business or employment opportunities and other monetary losses.”  Id.  Non-
economic damages refer to “damages arising from pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical 
impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, fear of injury, loss of society and 
companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation, and other nonpecuniary 
damage.”  Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
33
Glassman: Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
GLASSMAN1.DOC 4/19/2004  10:24 AM 
450 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:417 
non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases.215  This applies 
regardless of the number of defendants, the number of theories, or the 
number of family members who sue.216 Punitive damages are limited to 
twice compensatory damages or $250,000.217 
JJ.  Ohio 
In 1997, the Ohio legislature passed a series of civil reform 
legislation to place damage caps on non-economic damages, but the 
Ohio Supreme Court struck down the legislation as unconstitutional.218  
Recently, the Ohio legislature responded by passing a new series of 
legislation to place limitations on medical malpractice damages.219  A 
medical malpractice claim must be commenced within one year after the 
cause of action accrued.220 But if the injury could not have reasonably 
been discovered within a four-year window, the person must bring the 
action within one year after the person discovered the injury.221  In a 
medical malpractice claim, there is no limitation on compensatory 
damages that represent economic loss, but there is a $250,000 limitation 
on damages that represent non-economic damages.222  In the alternative, 
non-economic damages must not exceed an amount “equal to three times 
the plaintiff’s economic loss[,] . . . to a maximum of $350,000 for each 
plaintiff or a maximum of $500,000 for each occurrence.”223 
 
 215. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: North Dakota, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ northdakota.html (revised February 6, 1998); see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
62-02 (1996). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (Supp. 1997). 
 218. See Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 751 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999) (holding 
the civil justice reform legislation (Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350) unconstitutional on the grounds that it 
violated the “one-subject” rule-”no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly 
expressed in its title,” and the legislation violated separation of powers by overstepping its 
legislative bounds).  See also, Morris v. Savoy, 578 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (concluding a cap on 
general damages was unconstitutional because it “does not bear a real and substantial relation to 
public health or welfare and further because it is unreasonable and arbitrary”). 
 219. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2323.43, 2305.113 (2003). 
 220. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.113 (2003). 
 221. Id. 
 222. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (2003). 
 223. Id.  The statute also makes an exception that non-economic damages “shall not exceed 
$500,000 for each plaintiff or $1,000,000 for each occurrence if the noneconomic losses of the 
plaintiff are for either of the following: (a) Permanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use 
of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ system; (b) Permanent physical functional injury that 
permanently prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for self and perform 
life sustaining activities.”  Id. 
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KK.  Oklahoma 
Oklahoma limits punitive damages in medical malpractice cases.224  
In cases of reckless disregard of the rights of others, punitive damages 
are limited to $100,000.225 In cases of intentional and malicious acts, 
punitive damages are limited to the greater of $500,000, twice 
compensatory damages, or the benefit derived by defendant from his 
conduct.226  If the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant acted intentionally and with malice toward others or the court 
finds that there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
acted intentionally with malice and threatened human life, the cap does 
not apply.227 The court will reduce punitive damages if it finds that the 
defendant has already paid punitive damages in Oklahoma for the same 
misconduct.228 
LL.  Oregon 
The Oregon legislature established a $500,000 damage cap for non-
economic damages in all civil actions arising out of bodily injury, death, 
or property damage.229  The Oregon Supreme Court, however, found the 
non-economic damage cap to be unconstitutional because it violated a 
victim’s right to a trial by jury.230 
Punitive damages cannot be awarded against a health care 
practitioner, but the provision does not apply to hospitals or health care 
providers.231  In an action where punitive damages are awarded, 40 
percent of the punitive damages are paid to the prevailing party, of 
 
 224. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West 2003). 
 225. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West 2003); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary 
of Medical Malpractice Law: Oklahoma, http://www.mcandl.com/oklahoma.html (revised February 
6, 1998). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560 (2001).  The statute specifies that it does not apply to punitive 
damages.  Id. 
 230. See Lakin v. Senco Prod., Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999) (concluding that the noneconomic 
damage cap is unconstitutional because when a jury awards a verdict greater than the $500,000 
limit, the statute “prevents the jury from having its full and intended effect”).  Therefore, “to permit 
the legislature to override the effect of the jury’s determination of noneconomic damages would 
‘violate’ plaintiffs’ right to ‘Trial by Jury’.”  Id.  The Oregon Supreme Court made it clear, 
however, that it did not overrule Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789 (Or. 1995), which held that there 
was no right to trial by jury in a wrongful death action because a wrongful death claim was not 
recognized at common law, but was rather created by statute.  Id. at 77. 
 231. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.550 (2001). 
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which not more than 20 percent may be paid for attorneys’ fees.232  The 
remaining 60 percent must be paid to the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Account.233  The Oregon Supreme Court has held the 
punitive damages statute to be constitutional.234  Punitive damages can 
only be awarded in a civil action if it can be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that the party acted with malice or a “reckless . . . 
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk.”235 
MM.  Pennsylvania 
While Pennsylvania does not impose a cap on compensatory 
damages it is 
one of the states most seriously affected by the medical malpractice 
liability insurance crisis, continues to grapple with the problem. The 
Pennsylvania Department of Insurance released a new study showing 
that medical malpractice insurers lost $18 million in their operations in 
the state last year. The analysis shows that even after accounting for 
reserves, malpractice insurance underwriters in Pennsylvania incurred 
losses in 2002 for the fourth consecutive year. The state authorities 
said that the malpractice underwriters earned $46.4 million in 
investment income last year while paying out $345.9 million in claims, 
$136.9 million in legal costs and $81.1 million for taxes and other 
operating expenses. In response, Governor Ed Rendell has proposed 
state subsidies of $200 million to help doctors pay for insurance over 
the next three years. Doctors in the state buy the first $500,000.00 of 
coverage from private insurers and the second $500,000.00 from the 
state’s catastrophic insurance MCARE Fund.236 
Effective January 25, 1997, punitive damages against individual 
physicians shall not exceed 200 percent of compensatory damages, 
except in cases of intentional misconduct.237 Under current law, 25 
percent of punitive damages in medical malpractice cases must be paid 
 
 232. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (2001). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232 (Or. 2002) (holding that §18.540 does not 
violate the Oregon Constitution). 
 235. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537 (2001). 
 236. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174. 
 237. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.505(d) (LEXIS 2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 § 1301.812-
A(g) (LEXIS archives) (repealed 2002); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical 
Malpractice Law: Pennsylvania, http://www. mcandl.com/pennsylvania.html (revised May 30, 
2003).  Punitive damages, when awarded, shall not be less than $100,000, unless a lower verdict 
amount is returned by the trier of fact. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.505(d) (LEXIS 2003). 
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into a special, state sponsored Fund rather than to the prevailing party.238 
NN.  Rhode Island 
Rhode Island does not permit punitive damages in any action 
brought by or against the executor or administrator of an estate.239 There 
is a $250,000 minimum recovery in any wrongful death action.240 
OO.  South Carolina 
South Carolina does not impose a cap on the amount of damages 
that a claimant can recover in a medical malpractice case.241 
PP.  South Dakota 
In any action for damages for personal injury or death in a medical 
malpractice action in South Dakota, the total general damages may not 
exceed $500,000.242 This section formerly provided for a cap of 
$1,000,000 on all damages, whether economic or non-economic.243 The 
cap on all damages, however, was found to violate the state 
constitution.244  The court also held that the cap applied separately to the 
 
 238. Id.; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1303.505(e) (LEXIS 2003). 
 239. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-8 (1997); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical 
Malpractice Law: Rhode Island, http://www.mcandl.com/rhodeisland.html (revised February 6, 
1998). 
 240. R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-2 (1997). 
 241. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: South Carolina, 
http://www.mcandl. com/southcarolina.html (revised February 6, 1998).  However, South Carolina 
has established a Patients’ Compensation Fund to benefit licensed health care providers.  Id.  The 
Fund is responsible for the payment of that portion of any medical malpractice or general liability 
judgment or settlement which exceeds $100,000 per incident and $300,000 in the annual aggregate. 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-79-420 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).  All health care providers can participate 
in the Fund. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-79-440 (Law. Co-op. 1989).  As members, the health care 
provider must pay an annual fee.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-79-450 (Law. Co-op. 1989).  Upon being 
served with a complaint, the health care provider must notify the Fund’s Board of Governors of the 
action.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-79-480 (Law. Co-op. 1989). If the board determines that the damage 
amounts may exceed $200,000, the Fund can appear and actively defend the Fund.  Id.  The insurer 
providing liability insurance to the health care provider must provide an adequate defense so as to 
prevent impairment of the Fund.  Id.  Settlements that exceed $200,000 must be approved by the 
Board of Governors.  Id. 
 242. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  § 21-3-11 (Michie Supp. 1997); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, 
Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: South Dakota, http://www.mcandl.com/southdakota.html 
(revised May 23, 1998).  Damages awarded for non-economic injury such as pain and suffering.  Id. 
 243. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  § 21-3-11 (Michie Supp. 1986). 
 244. Knowles v. United States, 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996). The Knowles decision 
automatically revived the form of the act as it existed prior to being amended in 1985, at which time 
it provided for a $500,000 cap on general damages.  Id. 
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personal injury claim of the infant plaintiff and to his parents’ claim for 
medical expenses and loss of services.245 
QQ.  Tennessee 
Tennessee does not place a cap on the amount of damages 
recoverable in a medical malpractice action.246 
RR.  Texas 
In September 2003, the Texas legislature replaced its former 
damage cap provisions with a new set of medical malpractice 
provisions.247  In a medical malpractice claim involving a physician or 
health care provider, other than a health care institution, non-economic 
damages are limited to $250,000.248  In a medical malpractice action 
against one health care institution, non-economic damages are likewise 
limited to $250,000.249  If a final judgment is rendered against more than 
one health care institution, non-economic damages are limited to 
$250,000 for each health care institution, but not to exceed $500,000 
inclusive of all health care institutions involved.250 
In a wrongful death action based on medical malpractice, non-
economic damages are limited to $500,000 regardless of the number of 
physicians, health care providers, or separate causes of action.251  This 
limit will be adjusted according to an increase or decrease in the 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Tennessee, 
http://www.mcandl.com/ tennessee (revised February 6, 1998). 
 247. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.301, 74.302, 74.303 (2004).  These statutes 
replaced former TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 11.02 and 11.03.  See also, Rose v. 
Doctors Hospital, 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990) (concluding that since a wrongful death claim is 
based on statutory law and not common law, the “open court” provision does not bar the Medical 
Liability Act’s damage cap provisions).  In Upton County v. Brown, 960 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App. 
1997), the court noted that Rose  was superseded by the Texas legislature in §§ 71.002, 71.021 to 
the extent that Rose concluded at common law, a personal injury claim expired at the claimant’s 
death and the decedent’s survivors did not have a cause of action.  Id. at 815.  See also, Lucas v. 
United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988) (holding that the former damage cap provisions were 
only unconstitutional when applied to common-law claims); Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. 
Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2000) (limiting the Lucas holding to apply only to common-law claims); 
Detar Hospital, Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App. 1985) (holding former Texas statute 
§4590i unconstitutional because the statutes absolute limitation on damages “is an unreasonable 
infringement on a plaintiff’s constitutionally guaranteed right to obtaining full redress for injuries 
caused by another’s wrongful conduct”). 
 248. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN 74.301 (2004). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.303 (2004). 
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consumer price index.252 
The Texas legislature has also placed a cap on punitive damages 
that are to be considered separately from other compensatory 
damages.253  Punitive damages are limited not to exceed two times the 
amount of economic damages plus an amount equal to any non-
economic damages found by the jury, however, not to exceed 
$750,000.254  The punitive damage limitation does not apply to certain 
felonies.255 
Prior to 2003, Texas limited damages in a medical malpractice 
action for wrongful death to $500,000, in 1977 dollars.256  This amount 
was adjusted annually for inflation.257  As of 2002, it was valued at 
approximately $1,300,000.258  The statute was intended to apply to all 
medical malpractice cases, but has been held to be unconstitutional 
except with respect to wrongful death.259 
Moreover, before 2003, Texas law limited punitive damages in 
cases arising after September 1, 1995, to two times the amount of 
economic damages, plus an amount equal to non-economic damages 
found by the jury, not to exceed $750,000, or $200,000, whichever is 
greater.260 This was formerly four times actual damages or $200,000, 
whichever is greater.261 The cap on punitive damages does not apply in 
cases of certain felonies, including fraudulent destruction or 
concealment of written records.262 
SS.  Utah 
Utah limits damages recoverable for non-economic loss, to 
compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience.263  In an action 
arising before July 1, 2001, non-economic damages may not exceed 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (2004). 
 254. Id.  If there are not non-economic damages found, punitive damages must not exceed 
$250,000.  Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (West Supp. 1998); McCullough, 
Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Texas, 
http://www.mcandl.com/texas.html (revised August 13, 1999). 
 257. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.04 (West Supp. 1998). 
 258. McCullough, Texas, supra note 256. 
 259. Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990); McCullough, Texas, supra note 256. 
 260. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West 1997). 
 261. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (West 1991) (repealed 1995). 
 262. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West 1997). 
 263. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (2001); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of 
Medical Malpractice Law: Utah, http://www.mcandl.com/utah.html (revised May 21, 1999). 
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$250,000.264  For an action arising on or after July 1, 2001 and before 
July 1, 2002, the limit is adjusted for inflation to $400,000.265 
TT.  Vermont 
Vermont does not place a cap on the amount of damages a claimant 
may recover in a medical malpractice action.266 
UU.  Virginia 
Virginia places a maximum recovery limit on all damages in 
medical malpractice cases.267  For claims arising out of acts or omissions 
prior to August 1, 1999, the total amount recoverable for any injury to, 
or death of, a patient shall not exceed the limitation on recovery set forth 
in the statute as it was in effect when the act or acts of malpractice 
occurred.268  For acts or omissions on or after August 1, 1999, and 
before July 1, 2000, the cap is $1.5 million.269  The statute provides that 
the cap is increased by $50,000 every July 1.270 Two final increases of 
$75,000 beginning in 2007 will bring the damage cap to $2 million for 
acts or omissions on or after July 1, 2008.271  The Virginia Supreme 
Court has twice considered this legislation and held that it does not 
violate the U.S. or Virginia constitutions.272  A settlement with one 
defendant reduces the maximum liability of the others, as the cap limits 
the total amount recoverable for an injury to a patient, regardless of the 
number of theories or defendants.273  This includes punitive damages.274  
In cases arising prior to March 28, 1994, when the definition of “health 
care provider” was broadened, a physician’s professional corporation 
may be subject to uncapped liability.275 
 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id.  Beginning July 1, 2002, and each July 1 thereafter, the limit for damages shall be 
adjusted for inflation by the state treasurer.  Id. 
 266. McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Vermont, 
http:www.mcandl.com/ vermont.html (revised February 6, 1998). 
 267. VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-581.15 (2003); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of 
Medical Malpractice Law: Virginia, http://www.mcandl.com/virginia (revised June 2, 2003). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Serv., Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999); Etheridge v. Med. 
Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989); McCullough, Virginia, supra note 267. 
 273. Fairfax Hosp. Sys. v. Nevitt, 457 S.E.2d 10 (Va. 1995). 
 274. Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1990). 
 275. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (LEXIS 2003); Schwartz v. Brownlee, 482 S.E.2d 827 (Va. 
1997). 
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Virginia limits punitive damages to $350,000.276  This cap has also 
been found constitutional.277 
VV.  Washington 
Washington limited non-economic damages for personal injury or 
death to an amount determined by multiplying 0.43 by the average 
annual wage and by the life expectancy of the person incurring the non-
economic damages.278  However, the Supreme Court of Washington has 
held that this cap on non-economic damages is an unconstitutional 
infringement of the right to trial by jury.279 
WW.  West Virginia 
Prior to 2003, West Virginia juries were instructed that the 
maximum they could award against a health care provider for non-
economic loss was $1,000,000.280 While this statute was held to be 
constitutional,281 in March 2003: 
West Virginia Governor Bob Wise signed into law a bill that caps 
medical malpractice pain and suffering awards at $250,000.00, except 
in cases of wrongful death or bodily impairment, when the cap is 
$500,000.00. Another provision in the bill calls for a doctor-owned and 
managed physicians’ mutual insurance company to be up and running 
no later than July 1, 2004.282 
XX.  Wisconsin 
The Wisconsin legislature has established a non-economic damage 
cap in medical malpractice actions of $350,000 to be adjusted to reflect 
changes in the consumer price index.283  The Wisconsin Court of 
 
 276. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (LEXIS 2003). 
 277. McCullough, Virginia, supra note 267; see Wackenhut Applied Tech. Ctr., Inc. v. 
Sygnetron Prot. Sys., Inc., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 278. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (West 1988). 
 279. Sofie v. Fireboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, 
Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Washington, http://www.mcandl.com/washington.html 
(revised February 6, 1998). 
 280. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (1994); McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical 
Malpractice Law: West Virginia, http://www.mcandl.com/westvirgina.html (revised February 6, 
1998). 
 281. Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991). 
 282. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 174. 
 283. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.55.  The statute also places a statute of limitations for a medical 
malpractice claim of three years from the date of the injury or one year from the date the injury was 
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Appeals has held the medical malpractice non-economic damage cap to 
be constitutional.284 
Damages for wrongful death are limited by a separate wrongful 
death statute, even when the wrongful death was caused by medical 
malpractice.285  The Wisconsin wrongful death statute was amended for 
cases after April 28, 1998 to increase the damage cap to $500,000 for the 
death of a minor and $350,000 for the death of an adult.286 
YY.  Wyoming 
The Wyoming Constitution provides, “[n]o law shall be enacted 
limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or 
death of any person.”287 Thus, Wyoming does not limit the amount of 
damages one may recover in a medical malpractice action.288 
V. THE FAILURE OF CAPS IN CALIFORNIA: A CASE STUDY 
As noted above, California enacted a medical malpractice cap law, 
entitled “The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act” (MICRA), in 
1975.  MICRA: 
(1) placed a $250,000.00 cap on the amount of compensation paid to 
malpractice victims for their non-economic injuries; (2) eliminated the 
collateral source rule that forces those found liable for malpractice to 
pay all the expenses incurred by the victim; (3) permitted those found 
liable for malpractice to pay the compensation they owe victims on an 
installment plan basis; (4) imposed a short statute of limitations on 
malpractice victims (generally, three years); (5) established a sliding 
 
discovered.  Id. 
 284. See Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 623 N.W.2d 776 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (holding the 
non-economic damage cap unconstitutional because “there is a rational relationship between the 
prospective application of the cap on the recovery of noneconomic damages (affecting all plaintiffs 
from the effective date of the cap forward) and the legislature’s goal of preserving health-care 
services in Wisconsin”).  In Martin v. Richardson, 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995), the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that a previous non-economic damage cap was unconstitutional because its 
retroactive application would result in minimal reduced payouts to plaintiffs.  Id. at 588. 
 285. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.55.  Furthermore, “[i]f damages in excess of the limit under § 
895.04 are found, the court shall make any reduction required under § 895.045 and shall reward the 
lesser of the reduced amount or the limit under §895.04.”  Id. 
 286. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.04.  When a jury awards damages that are in excess of the damage 
cap, the court shall reduce the award to the maximum amount.  Id.  See also, 1997 WIS. ACT 89.; 
Neiman v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 613 N.W.2d 160 (Wis. 2000) (holding the retroactive 
damage increase provision of §895.04 was unconstitutional). 
 287. WYO. CONST. art. 10, § 4; McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Summary of Medical 
Malpractice Law: Wyoming, http://www.mcandl.com/wyoming (revised February 6, 1998). 
 288. Id. 
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scale for attorneys’ fees that discouraged lawyers from accepting 
serious or complicated medical malpractice cases.289 
Following MICRA’s enactment, malpractice liability insurance 
premiums continued to rise.  “By 1988, twelve years after the passage of 
MICRA, California medical malpractice premiums had reached an all-
time high – 450% higher than 1975, when MICRA was enacted.”290  In 
fact, “[d]uring the mid 1980’s, California malpractice premiums 
increased by more than 20% annually.”291 
While insurers maintained that the increase was due to court 
challenges to MICRA, following the California Supreme Court’s 
decision to validate the damage cap in 1985: “malpractice premiums 
increased more dramatically in 1986 than any year since the passage of 
MICRA.  Between 1985, when the cap was upheld, and 1988, 
malpractice premiums soared 47%.”292 
Facing yet another crisis in its health care system, California 
enacted California Insurance Code § 1861.01, commonly known as 
Proposition 103.  Proposition 103 “explicitly required insurance 
premium rollbacks of up to 20%.”293  “[M]edical malpractice rates in 
California began to fall immediately after the passage of Proposition 
103, and within three years . . . total medical malpractice premiums had 
dropped by 20.2% from the 1988 high.  After adjusting for inflation, the 
premium drop . . . actually [amounted to] 30.7%.”294 
With Proposition 103 firmly in place, medical malpractice liability 
premiums initially fell, and then stabilized.295  Since the inception of 
Proposition 103, the annual variations in medical malpractice premiums 
in California have been “significantly less drastic and, as a result of the 
regulatory process, [became] far more predictable under the regulated 
system than ever before.”296 
Based upon the foregoing data, one may reasonably conclude that 
the stability achieved in medical malpractice insurance premiums in the 
state of California since 1988 is attributable to the regulation of 
insurance rates, and not to caps on non-economic damage awards. 
 
 289. The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, How Insurance Reform Lowered 
Doctors’ Medical Malpractice Rates in California: and How Malpractice Caps Failed, 
www.consumerwatchdog.com (March 7, 2003) [hereinafter FTCR]. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
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 294. Id. 
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VI.   THE WEISS STUDY: CAPS DO NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS 
While caps on medical malpractice insurers do reduce the burden 
on such insurers, statistically, caps do not lead to a reduction in medical 
malpractice insurance premiums.297 
On June 2, 2003, Weiss Ratings Inc., a private ratings agency, and 
one of the nation’s top five raters of life/health insurers, 298 released the 
results of a study entitled, “The Impact of Non-Economic Damage Caps 
on Physician Premiums, Claims Payout Levels, and Availability of 
Coverage.”  The study relied upon data provided by the National 
Practitioner Data Bank, and it “compared the median payouts in the 19 
states with caps to those in the 32 states without caps for the period 
between 1991 and 2002.”299 
Weiss found: 
 
 297. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2. 
 298. United States General Accounting Office, Comparison of Private Agency Ratings for 
Life/Health Insurers, http://www.weissratings.com/gao _study.asp (September 1994).  At the 
request of the Rep. Cardiss Collins, Chairwoman of the House Subcommittee on Commerce, the 
U.S. General Accounting Office undertook a comparison of the rating systems of the five major 
raters of life/health insurers – A.M. Best (Best), Duff & Phelps (D&P), Moody’s, Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) and Weiss Research (Weiss) over the period August 31, 1989, to June 30, 1992, to 
determine which raters were first to report the vulnerability of financially impaired or insolvent 
insurers.  Id.  According to the GAO: 
United States Government Insurer ratings could not be easily compared across the five 
rating agencies because they did not all use the same approach and methods to rate 
insurer financial health. Rating scales and descriptions of ratings varied by agency and 
over time. Weiss placed far less reliance than the other agencies on analysts’ judgment. 
Coverage differed – Weiss was the only agency to rate more than half of all insurers. 
Finally, Weiss and Moody’s were less likely than the other agencies to assign insurers 
their top ratings. 
  
Best and Weiss provided the most comprehensive coverage of life/health insurers; 
between them, they rated the majority of financially impaired life/health insurers. Weiss’ 
ratings reflected financial vulnerability first three times more often than Best in the cases 
we compared. On average, Weiss’ ratings reflected financial vulnerability 8 months 
earlier than Best. The other agencies – D&P, Moody’s and S&P – rated, at most, five of 
the life/health insurers that became financially impaired during our comparison period. 
These five, among the six largest such insurers, were also rated by Best and Weiss. 
Weiss was the first to assign a vulnerable rating in five of the six cases; Moody’s – 
which rated only two of the six insurers—was first in the sixth case. In no case was Best, 
S&P, or D&P first to reflect financial vulnerability for these six insurers. In four of these 
cases, Best did not assign a vulnerable rating until after the first public regulatory action. 
Our results are not projectible and apply only to the time period of less than 3 years that 
the data cover. 
Id. 
 299. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2. 
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Payouts reduced. In states without caps, the median payout for the 
entire 12-year period was $116,297.00, ranging from $75,000.00 on 
the low end to $220,000.00 on the high end. In states with caps, the 
median was 15.7% lower, or $98,079.00, ranging from $50,000.00 to 
$190,000.00. Since caps in many states were not imposed until late in 
the 12-year period, this represents a significant reduction. 
Growth in payouts slowed substantially. The median payout in the 32 
states without caps increased by 127.9%, from $65,831.00 in 1991 to 
$150,000.00 in 2002. In contrast, payouts in the 19 states with caps 
increased at a far slower pace by 83.3%, from $60,000.00 in 1991 to 
$110,000.00 in 2002.300 
Weiss interpreted this data to mean that “caps do accomplish their 
intended purpose of lowering the average amount insurance companies 
must pay out to satisfy medical malpractice claims.”301 
However, it was found that despite lowering the insurers’ payout 
obligations, “insurers continue to increase premiums at a rapid pace, 
regardless of caps.”302 
This conclusion was drawn by Weiss “using 1991 to 2002 data 
published by the Medical Liability Monitor.”303  More specifically, 
Weiss examined “the median medical malpractice premiums paid by 
doctors in three high-risk specialties—internal medicine, general 
surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology.”304 In so doing, Weiss found: 
1. States with caps had sharper increases in median annual premiums. 
Since the insurers in the states with caps reaped the benefit of lower 
med mal payouts, one would expect that they’d reduce the premiums 
they charged doctors. At the very minimum, they should have been 
able to slow down the rate of premium increases. Surprisingly, the data 
show they did precisely the opposite: 
• In the 19 states with caps, the median annual premium 
increased by 48.2%, from $20,414 in 1991 to $30,246 in 
2002. 
• In the 32 states without caps, the median annual premium 
actually increased at a slower pace—by 35.9%, from $22,118 
in 1991 to $30,056 in 2002. 
Thus, on average, doctors in states with caps actually suffered a 
 
 300. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2. 
 301. Id. 
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 303. Id. 
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significantly larger increase than doctors in states without caps. 
2. A smaller proportion of states with caps were able to contain 
premium increases. In some states, the median annual premiums 
remained flat or even declined at various times during the period. Was 
this related to the imposition of caps? In the overwhelming majority of 
states, the answer is clearly “no.” Indeed. . . 
• Among the 19 with caps, only two states, or 10.5%, 
experienced flat or declining med mal premiums following 
the imposition of caps. 
• Meanwhile, among the 32 without caps, the record was 
actually much better: Six states, or 18.7%, experienced flat or 
declining premiums. 
3. Premiums in states with caps are more likely to exceed national 
median. Focusing on the most recent data, we find that: 
• In 47.4% of the states with caps (9 out of 19), 2002 median 
premiums were below the national median premium of 
$30,093. 
• Meanwhile, in 50% of the states without caps (16 out of 32), 
2002 median premiums were below the national median. 
In short, the results clearly invalidate the expectations of cap 
proponents. To review the surprising facts: 
• Insurers in states with caps raised their premiums at a 
significantly faster pace than those in states without caps. 
• Even with the imposition of caps, insurers in nearly nine out 
of ten states continued to raise rates, while insurers in states 
without caps were actually more likely to hold or cut their 
premium rates. 
• In states with caps, insurers are more likely to charge med mal 
premiums exceeding the national median than those in states 
without caps. 
Based upon the above findings, Weiss concluded that such 
“counter-intuitive”305 results “can lead to only one conclusion: there are 
other, far more important factors driving the rise in medical malpractice 
premiums than caps or medical malpractice payouts.”306 
 
 305. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2. 
 306. Id. 
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VII.  OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ESCALATION OF 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS 
According to the Weiss study, six factors are significant in driving 
up medical malpractice insurance premiums, “each of which may be 
exerting a greater impact on premiums than the presence or absence of 
caps.”307 These factors include: 
(1) medical cost inflation; (2) the cyclical nature of the insurance 
market; (3) the need to shore up reserves for policies in force; (4) a 
decline in investment income; (5) overall financial safety 
considerations; and (6) the supply and demand of coverage.308 
As to medical cost inflation, Weiss noted that the inflation rate in 
the 12-year period studied was 75 percent.309 “However, throughout the 
country, insurers had a general tendency to let their premium increases 
lag behind the pace of medical inflation. This was most likely due to the 
extended soft market experienced by the entire property and casualty 
insurance industry in the 1990’s, explained below.”310 
Next, with respect to the cyclical nature of the insurance market, 
Weiss maintained that such market 
is historically and fundamentally cyclical, with periods of rising 
premium rates followed by periods of steady or declining premiums. In 
the declining portion of the cycle—”a soft market”—insurers relax 
their underwriting standards and underprice their products in order to 
retain or gain market share. 
The most recent soft market lasted longer than usual—12 years, from 
1987 to 1999—probably because of the raging bull market in stocks. 
Insurers made so much money in their investments they were able to 
aggressively underprice their policies, deliberately lose money in their 
underwriting, and still turn a profit overall. As a result, losses in their 
core operations, more than offset by surging gains from the stock 
market boom, were largely overlooked by the industry and regulators 
alike. 
All that changed when the stock market boom turned to bust. Property 
and casualty insurers had to confront the ramifications of their loose 
underwriting practices: not enough money in premiums collected to 
cover anticipated claims. That’s when they began to seriously tighten 
 
 307. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2. 
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underwriting standards and raise premium rates.311 
Concerning the need for insurers to shore up reserves for policies in 
force, Weiss noted: 
When insurers write a new policy, they look at past claims experience, 
make some actuarial assumptions, and place a portion of that policy’s 
premium into a reserve to cover expected future claims. A prudent 
insurer will make conservative assumptions and err on the side of 
having more in reserve than it ultimately needs to pay claims. At the 
end of each year, the insurer then evaluates its reserves for each block 
of business and determines if a change is warranted to either add or 
subtract reserves. 
Data reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) show that med mal insurers have been consistently under-
reserving since 1997—to the tune of $4.6 billion through December 
31, 2001. The under-reserving came to a head in 1999, at the tail end 
of the soft market. That’s when loose underwriting practices caught up 
with the insurers, as claims rose to a higher level than expected. Thus, 
even before the bull market ended in the stock market, insurers were 
coming under increasing pressure to boost their reserves to make up 
for past shortfalls. 
There’s only one place these funds could come from—the company’s 
capital; and there was only one way the company could maintain or 
build its capital—by making more profits. Thus, premium increases 
were inevitable.312 
With respect to the decline in insurers’ investment income, Weiss 
found: 
Until 2000, most of the additional profits insurers needed could be 
covered by rising investment income and gains from the booming 
stock market. But during the three-year bear market from 2000 to 
2002, as large stock market gains turned to even larger stock market 
losses, insurers were confronted with double trouble: 
(1) After just one year of premium increases, they still had barely 
begun to restore their reserves. (2) Now, aggravating their 
difficulties, they also needed to compensate for stock market 
losses. With falling stock prices and declining interest rates, 
investment income7 for the entire property/casualty industry fell 
23% in 2001 compared to 2000, and then another 2.5% in 2002; 
and we must assume that med mal insurers suffered a similar 
 
 311. Weiss Ratings, supra note 2. 
 312. Id. 
48
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss3/1
GLASSMAN1.DOC 4/19/2004  10:24 AM 
2004] FEDERAL CAPS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 465 
decline. Indeed, investment income is particularly critical for lines 
of business like med mal where the duration of claims payouts 
typically span several years.313 
Thus, it was the combination of two powerful forces—under-reserving 
throughout most of the 1990s plus the rapid fall in investment income 
in the 2000s—that largely drove the unusually rapid premium 
increases, not only in med mal, but in many other property and 
casualty lines as well.314 
Addressing the issue of insurers’ financial safety, Weiss opined: 
“[I]f insurers do not replace capital that has been used to shore up 
reserves, the financial strength of the company deteriorates, ultimately 
leading to the possibility of financial failure.”315 
Finally, turning to the supply and demand of coverage, the Weiss 
study found that: 
Press reports have highlighted the plight of physicians around the 
country who are closing up shop because their med mal insurer is 
pulling out of the local market. 
To help determine if this is an industry-wide problem, for each year 
between 1991 and 2002, we counted the number of insurers that are 
writing new med mal policies and/or renewing existing policies. 
The number of carriers providing med mal coverage nationwide 
increased from 244 in 1991 to a peak of 274 in 1997. Since 1997, 
however, the number of carriers declined steadily to a low of 241 in 
2001, recovering slightly to 247 in 2002. 
Compared to 1991, therefore, there has actually been a modest 
increase in the number of med mal carriers—from 244 to 247. 
However, doctors are currently feeling the pressures of diminished 
supply reflected in the declining trend since 1997. Moreover, in certain 
regions and in certain medical specialties, there is abundant anecdotal 
evidence that certain med mal insurers have pulled out or discontinued 
coverage.316 
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VIII.  ALTERNATIVES TO CAPS 
If caps are ineffective in driving down medical malpractice liability 
premiums, then what can be done to solve the current crisis in health 
care?  The Weiss study lays out a five step approach that targets the root 
causes leading to the dramatic escalation of medical malpractice liability 
insurance premiums: 
1. Legislators must immediately put on hold all proposals involving 
non-economic damage caps until convincing evidence can be 
produced to demonstrate a true benefit to doctors in the form of 
reduced med mal costs. Right now, consumers are being asked to 
sacrifice not only large damage claims, but also critical leverage to 
help regulate the medical profession—all with the stated goal that it 
will end the med mal crisis for doctors. However, the data indicate 
that, similar state legislation has merely produced the worst of both 
worlds: The sacrifice by consumers plus a continuing —and even 
worsening—crisis for doctors. Neither party derived any benefit 
whatsoever from the caps. 
2. Regulators must review and revise their parameters for approving 
rate increases. The big lesson to be learned from the past decade is 
that it’s dangerous to count on volatile investments—especially 
common stocks—to compensate for poor operations. 
 . . . . 
3. Insurance companies must never again allow marketing to divert or 
pervert prudent actuarial analysis and planning. Consumers and 
medical professionals can accept rate increases provided they are 
spread out evenly over time, and provided they are given good 
value for their premium dollars in terms of claims paying ability 
and stability. They cannot accept rate increases that are designed to 
cover up, or compensate for, serious mismanagement. 
4. The medical profession must assume more responsibility for 
policing itself, while states must be more pro-active in reviewing 
the licenses of individual practitioners who have a significantly 
higher-than-average number of claims against them in their 
specialty, in proportion to their level of activity. These individuals 
greatly increase the risk associated with their specialties, pushing 
med mal premiums up for all doctors in that sector. States must also 
make major strides to share data on high-risk doctors. At the very 
minimum, they must cease licensing doctors who have lost their 
licenses in other states, often due to high-cost medical mistakes. 
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5. Consumers must not relinquish their right to sue for non-economic 
damages until the medical profession and/or state and federal 
governments provide more adequate supervision and regulation of 
doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers.317 
In sum, the Weiss study concludes that caps “will not make a 
significant dent in the problem, and may even have adverse impacts. It is 
no substitute for longer-term, fundamental solutions that address the 
actual factors behind the medical malpractice crisis.”318 
IX.   CONCLUSION 
It is undeniable that caps on non-economic damage awards have 
resulted in lower claim payouts for insurers.  However, as California’s 
MICRA experiment and the GAO and Weiss studies have demonstrated, 
this has not translated into a reduction in medical malpractice premiums 
for physicians.  The failure of caps to effectively drive down the cost of 
medical malpractice liability insurance is directly related to the fact that 
caps merely address one of several factors that have caused the dramatic 
escalation of medical malpractice liability insurance rates over the past 
decade. 
In short, “broad market forces prevailing in the property/casualty 
industry have driven — and continue to drive — medical malpractice 
premiums up, evidently overwhelming any reduction in jury awards.”319 
Thus, “by focusing on caps as a solution:”320 
[T]he insurance companies and their supporters are diverting the 
public’s attention away from long years of mismanagement by an 
industry that continually allowed actuarial prudence to take a back seat 
to marketing strategy. 
The insurers, insurance regulators and insurance legislators are 
avoiding a much-needed post-mortem on what really went wrong in 
the property and casualty industry in general and in the med mal sector 
in particular.321 
At this juncture, what is needed is less hysteria, and more of a focus 
on what is driving the current crisis in health care.  Until legislators and 
the special interests they represent recognize that greater reform, 
regulation and policing is warranted in both the medical and insurance 
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industries, the current epidemic will continue to fester. 
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